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Abstract 
The ever-growing penetration level of distributed generation in distribution networks, despite the undoubted 
advantages, has a profound impact on the network operation. The electric distribution system is transformed 
from a single-source into a multi-source network with bi-directional flow of energy. This change in network 
structure poses new challenges to the protection system at distribution level. With the Distributed Renewable 
Energy Sources (DRESs) also contributing to the fault current, the protection philosophy applied in radial 
one-way current flow is no longer valid. Therefore, traditional protection schemes need to be extensively 
investigated, as more and more DRESs get introduced into the network. This thesis discusses the various 
impacts of DRESs on relay protection of MV distribution networks. Initially, the various issues caused by 
the integration of DRESs are analyzed. Then analytical expression for the calculation of the fault currents is 
extracted in the case of a two-feeder benchmark grid, under different DRESs types and penetration levels. 
The calculations are based on the latest version of the IEC60909 Standard. Finally, the maximum DRES 
hosting capacity in terms of protection problems is estimated. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
A traditional power system grid has a structure with an up-down power flow. In this vertical hierarchy, 
large centralized power generating plants, hydro, thermal or nuclear, produce the electric power demanded 
by the consumers. Then this power is transferred to the end-customers through high voltage transmission 
lines and distribution networks. Nowadays, the existing grid structure is changing from vertical to horizontal 
configuration. The main driving factor for this change is the availability of renewable energy sources at end-
user locations, which are mostly in low and medium voltage levels. The introduction of Distributed 
Renewable Energy Sources (DRES) in the distribution grid has several advantages like, improved power 
quality, increased reliability and reduced losses. However, the increasing penetration of distributed 
generators causes numerous complications in regard to the system voltage profile, power quality, adequacy, 
security, power flow control, energy management, frequency control and protection.  
System protection, in the presence of DRES, has been a conspicuous issue in recent years and needs 
immediate consideration. Distribution systems are primarily protected with the help of current sensing 
devices such as overcurrent relays (OC), reclosers and fuses. These devices monitor the current flow through 
the protected element and generate trip signals to the circuit breaker if the fault current flow is more than the 
specified value. The protection philosophy of the distribution systems is designed based on the assumption 
that these are radial in nature and power flow is always unidirectional from the source to consumers [1]. 
Distribution systems with large DRES penetration levels representing bidirectional power flows and 
topology-dependent fault currents could affect protection devices, cause danger to the maintenance 
personnel, and result in uncontrollable under-/overvoltage and frequency. IEEE Standard 1547 issued in 
2003 [2] identified this problem and proposed the DER units to stop energizing the distribution system when 
there is a fault in the grid. However, as the capacity of installed DRES increases, disconnection of a large 
number of DRES units is no longer an option. In the presence of high DRES penetration level the distributed 
power generation units must possess FRT capabilities and stay connected to the grid during faults. However, 
this might pose limits to the DRES hosting capacity of distribution grids, as they might interfere with the 
smooth operation of protection devices.  
This thesis aims at providing a deep insight on the protection issues under different DRES penetration 
levels and technologies. The impact of the DRESs on the smooth operation of protection devices in MV 
distribution grids will be investigated, which in turn poses limits to their DRES hosting capacity. Two types 
of DRES technologies are examined; the direct-fed and the converter-interfaced DRESs. In this thesis, only 
traditional over-current protection relays are considered. The study will be initially performed in a radial 
two-feeder distribution grid. Parameters of this study are the point of installation and the total capacity of the 
DRESs, the fault location and the upstream grid short-circuit capacity. Initially, the impact of DRESs on the 
protection of a two-feeder distribution grid is quantified through analytical equations and tested in 
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DigSILENT Software. The method for fault current calculation is based on the Standard IEC60909, which 
considers both direct-fed and converter-interfaced DRESs. The theoretical results are validated for the 
CIGRE MV benchmark grid. The importance of this study lays in the fact that the maximum DRES 
penetration capacity can be defined in terms of protection coordination constraints, before a grid 
reinforcement is necessary. 
 
1.2. Overview and Structure 
This thesis is structured into 6 chapters. In addition to this introductory chapter, the outline of the other 
chapters is described below. 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of protection devices and protection coordination practices, currently used 
in LV and MV distribution networks.    
In Chapter 3 the effect of DRES penetration to the traditional overcurrent protection is presented.  
In Chapter 4, a detailed literature review regarding protection practices in the presence of a high share of 
DRESs is conducted. 
Chapter 5 presents the mathematical formulation of the protection problem. Initially a two-feeder 
benchmark network is examined. Analytical equations are derived for the fault current contribution by each 
source. In Section 5.4 worst case scenarios in terms of protection problems are identified, in order to define 
the maximum DRES hosting capacity of distribution grids, while in Section 5.5 the outcomes are validated in 
a modified version of the MV CIGRE benchmark network. 
Chapter 6 presents a method for calculating the maximum DRES penetration capacity, as it is limited by the 
DRES impact on the conventional protection means. 
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2. Grid protection 
2.1. Objective of Distribution System Protection  
The main objectives of distribution system protection are: 
i. To minimize the duration of a fault  
ii. To minimize the number of consumers affected by the fault  
The secondary objectives of distribution system protection are:  
i. To eliminate safety hazards as fast as possible  
ii. To limit service outages to the smallest possible segment of the system  
iii. To protect the consumers’ apparatus  
iv. To protect the system from unnecessary service interruptions and disturbances  
v. To disconnect faulted lines, transformers, or other apparatus.  
Overhead distribution systems are subject to two types of electrical faults, namely, transient (or 
temporary) faults and permanent faults. Depending on the nature of the system involved, approximately 70‐
80% of the total number of faults are temporary in nature. In overhead lines, the transient faults usually occur 
when phase conductors electrically contact other phase conductors or ground momentarily due to trees, birds 
or other animals, high winds, lightning, flashovers, etc. Transient faults are cleared by a service interruption 
of sufficient time to extinguish the power arc. In this study, the fault duration is minimized and unnecessary 
fuse blowing is prevented, by using instantaneous or high‐speed tripping and automatic reclosing of a relay‐
controlled power circuit breaker or the automatic tripping and reclosing of a circuit recloser. The breaker 
speed, relay settings, and recloser characteristics are selected in a manner to interrupt the fault current before 
a series fuse (i.e. the nearest source‐side fuse) is blown, which would cause the transient fault to become 
permanent.  
Permanent faults are those which require repairs by repair crew in terms of:  
i. Replacing burned‐down conductors, blown fuses, or any other damaged apparatus  
ii. Removing tree limbs from the line  
iii. Manually reclosing a circuit breaker or recloser to restore service  
Here, the number of customers affected by a fault is minimized by properly selecting and locating the 
protective apparatus on the feeder main, at the tap point of each branch, and at critical locations on branch 
circuits. Permanent faults are cleared by fuse cutouts installed at submain and lateral tap points. This practice 
limits the number of customers affected by a permanent fault and helps locate the fault point by reducing the 
area involved. In general, the only part of the distribution circuit not protected by fuses is the main feeder 
and feeder tie line. The substation is protected from faults on feeder and tie lines by circuit breakers and/or 
reclosers located inside the substation. 
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Most of the faults are permanent on an underground distribution system, thereby requiring a different 
protection approach. Although the number of faults occurring on an underground system is relatively much 
less than that on the overhead systems, they are usually permanent and can affect a larger number of 
customers. Faults occurring in the Underground Residential Distribution (URD) systems are cleared by the 
blowing of the nearest sectionalizing fuse. Faults occurring on the feeder are cleared by tripping and lockout 
of the feeder breaker. 	
2.2. Equipment  
A wide variety of equipment is used to protect the distribution networks. The particular type of protection 
depends on the system element being protected and the system voltage level, and, even though there are no 
specific standards for the overall protection of distribution networks, some general indication can be given. 
In the context of power system protection, we will first briefly describe the protective equipment.  
 
2.2.1. Medium-voltage protection equipment 
• HV HRC fuses  
Current-limiting High-voltage high-rupturing-capacity (HV HRC) fuses are overcurrent protection 
devices; they possess an element that is directly heated by the passage of current and is destroyed when 
the current exceeds a predetermined value. A suitably selected fuse should open the circuit by the 
destruction of the fuse element, eliminate the arc established during the destruction of the element and 
then maintain circuit conditions open with nominal voltage applied to its terminals, (i.e. no arcing across 
the fuse element). Fuses can only be used for short-circuit protection. They do not provide overload 
protection. A minimum short-circuit current is, therefore, required for correct operation. HV HRC fuses 
restrict the peak short-circuit current. The protective characteristic is determined by the selected rated 
current (Figure 2.1(a)) 
There is a number of standards to classify fuses according to the rated voltages, rated currents, 
time/current characteristics, manufacturing features and other considerations. For example, there are 
several sections of ANSI/UL 198‐1982 standards that cover low voltage fuses of 600 V or less. For 
medium and high voltage fuses within the range 2.3‐138 kV, standards such as ANSI/IEEE C37.40, 41, 
42, 46, 47 and 48 apply. Other organizations and countries have their own standards; in addition, fuse 
manufacturers have their own classifications and designations. 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 2.1: Grid Protection: a) Protective characteristic of HV HRC fuse and MV overcurrent-time protection, b) Protective 
characteristic of LV HRC fuse and LV circuit breaker with releases [3]. 
 
• Reclosers 
A recloser is a device with the ability to detect phase and phase‐to‐ground overcurrent conditions, to 
interrupt the circuit if the overcurrent persists after a predetermined time, and then to automatically 
reclose to re‐energize the line (Figure 2.2). If the fault that originated the operation still exists, then the 
recloser will stay open after a preset number of operations, thus isolating the faulted section from the 
rest of the system. In an overhead distribution system between 70 to 80% of the faults are of a 
temporary nature and last, at the most, for a few cycles or seconds. Thus, the recloser, with its 
opening/closing characteristic, prevents a distribution circuit being left out of service for temporary 
faults. Typically, reclosers are designed to have up to three open‐close operations and, after these, a 
final open operation to lock out the sequence. 
•  Medium-voltage circuit-breakers  
Circuit-breakers can provide time-overcurrent protection (definite-time and inverse), time-overcurrent 
protection with additional directional function, or differential protection. So far, distance protection has 
rarely been used in infrastructure and industrial grids owing to their low spatial extension. 
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Figure 2.2: Typical Sequence for Recloser Operation 
 
• Digital protection relays  
Protective relays whose characteristic curves are also determined by the actual current transformation 
ratio are used as protective devices in medium-voltage grids. Protective relays with digital circuits for 
medium-voltage protection have a lot of advantages over electromechanical and electronic relays: 
- Many functions being integrated in one device result in a compact design and low cost; 
- The self-monitoring of the devices makes them highly available and cause little maintenance 
expense; 
- Digital technology completely prevents the zero drift of characteristic measurement curves (owing 
to ageing effects, for example); 
- Digital filtering in combination with optimized measuring algorithms provides high measuring 
accuracy; 
- Data collection and data processing form the basis for many integrated additional functions such as 
load monitoring and event / fault recording; 
- Simple and ergonomically friendly handling by means of membrane keypads, user-configurable 
function keys, and display; 
- Manifold interfaces support user-friendly communication from the PC or remote-controlled; 
- Standardized communication protocols allow for interfacing to higher-level control systems; 
- Software-controlled parameterization and functionality integration ensure maximum flexibility in 
use and integrated engineering. 
 
In the process of digitalizing analogue-measured current and voltage values, measurements are first 
electrically isolated from the secondary circuit with the aid of an input transducer. Then, the 
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measurement signal is analogue-filtered and amplified. The A/D signal transducers generate digital 
measured quantities from the analogue signal (Figure 2.3). In dependency of the protection principles, 
the scan rate is between 12 and 20 signals per period. For critical devices, the scan rate is continuously 
adjusted as a function of the actual network frequency. The computer transmits a trigger command if 
applicable. 
 
Figure 2.3:Block diagram for a digital protection device [3]. 
 
2.2.2. Low-voltage protection equipment 
• LV HRC fuses  
Low-voltage high-rupturing-capacity (LV HRC) fuses have a high breaking capacity. They fuse quickly 
restricts the short-circuit current to the utmost degree. The protective characteristic is determined by the 
selected utilization category of the LV HRC fuse (for example full-range fuse for overload and short-
circuit protection, or back-up fuse for short-circuit protection only) and the rated current (Figure 2.1(b)). 
• Low-voltage circuit breakers 
Circuit-breakers for power distribution systems are basically distinguished as follows: 
- Type design (open or compact design) 
- Mounting type (fixed mounting, plug-in, withdrawable) 
- Rated current (maximum nominal current of the breaker) 
- Current limiting (either current-limiting = MCCB: molded-case circuit-breaker, or not current-
limiting = ACB: air circuit-breaker) 
- Protective functions (Section 2.2.3) 
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- Communication capability (capability to transmit data to and from the breaker) 
- Utilization category (A or B, IEC 60947-2; VDE 0660-101) 
 
2.2.3. Releases / protective functions 
The protective function of the circuit-breaker in the power distribution system is determined by the 
selection of the appropriate release (Figure 2.4). Releases can be divided into thermo-magnetic tripping units 
(TMTU, previously also called electromechanical releases) and electronic tripping units (ETU). 
• Overload protection L: (LT: long-time delay)  
Depending on the type of release, inverse-time-delay overload releases are also available with optional 
characteristic curves 
• Neutral conductor protection  
Inverse-time-delay overload releases for neutral conductors are available in a 50 % or 100 % ratio of the 
overload release 
• Short-circuit protection, instantaneous I: (INST: instantaneous) 
Depending on the application, I-releases can either be used with a fixed or an adjustable release current 
Ii as well as with a switch-off or non-switch-off function  
• Short-circuit protection, delayed S: (ST: short-time delay) 
To be used for a time adjustment of protective functions in series. Besides the standard curves and 
settings, there are also optional functions for special applications 
- Definite-time overcurrent releases 
For this “standard S function”, the desired delay time (tsd) is defined as of a set current value 
(threshold Isd) (definite time, similar to the function of “definite-time overcurrent-time protection  
- Inverse-time overcurrent releases 
In this optional S function, the product of I2t is always constant. In general, this function is used to 
improve the selectivity response (inverse time, similar to the function of “inverse-time overcurrent-time 
protection” at the medium-voltage level  
• Earth-fault protection G: (GF: ground fault) 
Besides the standard function (definite-time) an optional function (I2t = current-dependent delay) is also 
available 
• Fault-current protection RCD: (residual current device)  
Detects differential fault currents from 30mA up to 3A.  
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Figure 2.4: Variants of tripping curves [3]. 
 
2.3. Selectivity Criteria 
In addition to primary criteria of use such as rated current and rated switching capacity, selectivity is 
another important criterion for optimum supply reliability. The selective operation of series-connected 
protection devices is determined by the following criteria; a) Time difference for clearance (time grading) 
only, b) current difference for operating values (current grading) only and c) combination of time and current 
grading (inverse-time grading). Additionally, direction (directional protection), impedance (distance 
protection), and current difference (differential protection) are also used. 
Selectivity Rule No. 1 - The Use of Pickup Settings: Figure 2.5(a) shows how curves with different 
pickup values can be selective and illustrates the first rule of selectivity, which is, there is selectivity between 
two devices if the downstream device curve is located to the left of the upstream device curve. This can only 
happen when the pickup setting of the downstream device is set to a current that is less than the pickup 
setting of the upstream device. Note that the convention for time current curves is to end the rightmost 
portion of the curve at the maximum fault current that the device will sense in the power system it is applied 
in. Increasing the pickup setting shifts the curve toward the right of the graph. In this example, for any 
current up to the maximum fault current, the curve on the left (downstream device) will trip out before the 
curve on the right (upstream device).  
Selectivity Rule No. 2 - The Use of Delay Settings: Figure 2.5(b) shows how varying time delays can 
provide selectivity. Increasing the time delay shifts the curve upwards on the graph. Note that for all currents 
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within the range of the curves, the curve on the bottom will trip out before the cure above it. Thus, the 
second rule of selectivity is that the downstream device must be placed lower on the graph than the upstream 
device for the two devices to operate selectively. 
Usually effective protection of distribution grids combines both aforementioned rules; the use of different 
pickup level for the downstream and upstream devices as well as different delay setting. This enhances 
selectivity especially in the presence of distributed generation units.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 2.5: Selectivity rules: a) selectivity by proper selection of pickup settings and b) selectivity by proper selection of delay 
settings 
 
Putting It All Together - Identifying Complete Selectivity: Determining the selectivity of a set of time 
current curves is quite easy. The curves should line up in from left to right or bottom to top in the sequence 
of load to source. There should be no overlapping of the curves nor should they cross each other. There 
should be sufficient space separation between the curves. The curves can also indicate whether upstream 
devices provide back-up protection. This occurs when the leftmost portion of the back-up device extends 
over into the range of currents of the preferred device. 
Time current curves can also be used to ensure that distribution system components are properly protected 
from the secondary effects of fault currents. Note that the unfaulted components must be able to carry the 
fault current until the time it is cleared without sustaining damage to themselves. The time current curve can 
illustrate those qualities. Cable, transformer, and busway damage curves are commonly plotted on time 
current graphs and used to assure that the protection system will prevent damage from faults flowing through 
those conductors. The component damage curves may also be called a withstand curve, as they indicate the 
level of current and the amount of time that a component can sustain a potentially damaging current without 
overheating and damaging itself. 
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For withstand curves, we want the opposite to happen of what was described for nuisance tripping. For 
these curves, we want the protective device to clear the fault before the time indicated by the withstand 
curve. Thus, the circuit breaker curve must be entirely to the left or below the withstand curve of the 
component it is protecting. Any overlap or crossing of the circuit breaker curve with the withstand curve 
means that there is a range of currents for which that component is not adequately protected. 
The evaluation of selectivity among low voltage devices is straightforward once the limits are defined. 
Most low voltage device time characteristics are shown as a band. The left-most barrier may be referred in 
several different ways. In fuses, this limit is called the minimum melt time and is the point at which the 
fusible element begins to melt. With circuit breakers this limit may be expressed as either the “Maximum 
Resettable Delay” or the “Minimum Total Clearing Time”. The “Maximum Resettable Delay” is the 
maximum time that a given current may persist without causing the breaker to trip. A current can persist 
right up to the time defined by the curve with assurance that the breaker will not trip. The “Minimum Total 
Clearing Time” is the minimum amount of time that can be expected to clear the fault. It should be 
understood that at some time prior to this, the circuit breaker mechanism had been committed toward 
isolating the current. The time for the mechanism to operate and extinguish the arc inside the breaker has to 
occur before the minimum total clearing time. A time margin must be allowed to account for this time. 
The boundary to the right of the band is called the “Maximum Total Clearing Time.” At this boundary, 
the manufacturer assures us that the mechanism has acted and the fault current has been stopped completely. 
Manufacturing tolerances are accounted for by this limit, as well as all tolerances that may be affected by the 
standard service conditions (these are usually noted on the device’s published time current curve). When 
comparing one curve band to another, the devices are considered to be selective so long as the curves do not 
overlap anywhere and the source side device is above or to the right of the load side device. There should be 
a gap between the Maximum Total Clearing time of the load-side device and the Maximum Resettable Delay 
or Minimum Melt Time of the Source side device. As long as there is “daylight” between the curves 
(meaning they don’t touch each other or overlap), selectivity should be achieved. 
Selectivity and Overcurrent Relays Protective curves cannot be used in the same way as low voltage 
circuit breaker curves or fuse curves. The protective relay curve only represents the action of a calibrated 
relay. It doesn’t account for the actions of the associated circuit breaker or the accuracy of the current 
transformers that connect the relay to the circuit that it is monitoring. The curve represents the ideal 
operation of the relay. The manufacturing tolerances are not reflected in the curve. To coordinate an 
overcurrent relay with other protective devices, a minimum time margin must exist between the curves. 
This time margin can account for several things, including the circuit breaker clearing time, the tolerances 
of the circuit breaker and the relay, maintenance practices, and the effects of mild current transformer 
saturation. 
A time margin of about 0.35 seconds is generally used in most circumstances involving induction disk 
type relays. The 0.35 seconds includes 0.08 seconds for circuit breaker clearing time (4 cycles), 0.17 second 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
07/06/2020 16:42:36 EEST - 137.108.70.13
   12 
 
 
safety factor to account for maintenance practices and current transformer saturation, and 0.1 seconds for 
relay overtravel. Relay overtravel is the extra motion due to inertia that the induction disk will make after the 
current ceases. Reduced time margins are used in the following circumstances. If induction disk relays are 
calibrated annually, a 0.05 second deduction can be applied. Deduct 0.05 seconds when solid-state relays are 
applied since they typically don’t fall out of calibration as easily as induction disk relays. Also, solid state 
relays have negligible “overtravel”, so 0.1 sec can be deducted for this. Relay overtravel also doesn’t apply 
when the load side device is not an induction disk relay. 
 
2.3.1. Requirements for selective response of protective devices 
Protective devices can only act selectively if both the highest (Ikmax) and the lowest (Ikmin) short-circuit 
currents for the relevant system points are known at the project configuration stage. As a result, the highest 
short-circuit current determines the required rated short-circuit switching capacity of the circuit-breaker. 
(Criterion: Icu > Ikmax) and the lowest short-circuit current is important for setting the short-circuit release; the 
operating value of this release must be less than the lowest short-circuit current at the end of the line to be 
protected. Only this setting of Isd or Ii guarantees that the overcurrent release can fulfil its operator and 
system protection functions. Note that when using these settings, permissible setting tolerances of ±20 %, or 
the tolerance specifications given by the manufacturer must be observed. Generally, it is required: 
• The requirement that defined tripping conditions be observed determines the maximum conductor lengths 
or their cross sections.  
• Selective current grading can only be attained if the short-circuit currents are known. In addition to current 
grading, partial selectivity can be achieved using combinations of carefully matched protective devices.  
• In principle, the highest short-circuit current can be both the three-phase and the single-phase short-circuit 
current.  
• When feeding into LV networks, the single-phase fault current will be greater than the three-phase fault 
current if transformers with the Dy connection are used.  
• The single-phase short-circuit current will be the lowest fault current if the damping zero phase-sequence 
impedance of the LV cable is active.  
Since the selectivity response of protection and switching devices made by different manufacturers is not 
known, products supplied by one manufacturer only should be installed throughout if the planning criterion 
of "selectivity" is to be fulfilled. With large installations, it is advisable to determine all short-circuit currents 
using a special computer program.  
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2.3.2. Grading the operating currents with time grading 
Time grading also includes grading the operating currents. This means that the operating value of the 
overcurrent release belonging to the upstream circuit-breaker must generally be set with a factor of 1.5 
higher than that of the downstream circuit-breaker. Tolerances of operating currents in definite-time-delay 
overcurrent S-releases (±20 %) are thus compensated. When the manufacturer specifies narrower tolerances, 
this factor is reduced accordingly.  
Plotting the tripping characteristics of the graded protective devices together with their tolerance bands 
and breaker time to contact separation values in a grading diagram will help to verify and visualize 
selectivity. 
 
2.3.3. Medium-voltage time grading (tripping command and grading time) 
When determining the grading time tst, it must be kept in mind for the MV level that the set time elapses 
after the protective device was energized, before this device issues the trigger command to the shunt or 
undervoltage release of the circuit-breaker (command time tk). The release causes the circuit-breaker to open. 
The short-circuit current is interrupted when the arc has been extinguished. Only then does the protection 
system revert to the normal (rest) position (release time) (Figure 2.6). The grading time tst between 
successive protection devices must be greater than the sum of the total clearance time tg of the breaker and 
the release time of the protection system. Since response time tolerances, which depend on a number of 
factors, have to be expected for the protective devices (including circuit-breakers), a safety margin is 
incorporated in the grading time. Whereas grading times of less than 400 to 300ms are not possible with 
protective devices with mechanical releases, electronic releases have grading times of 300ms, and digital 
releases used with modern vacuum circuit-breakers even provide grading times of only 250 to 200ms. 
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Figure 2.6: Time grading in medium-voltage switchgear [3]. 
 
2.3.4. Low-voltage time grading (grading and delay times) 
Only the grading time tst and delay time tsd are relevant for time grading between several series-connected 
circuit-breakers or in conjunction with LV HRC fuses (Figure 2.7). The grading time tsd2 of breaker Q2 can 
roughly be equalized to the grading time tst2 and the delay time tsd3 of breaker Q3 is received from the sum of 
grading times tst2 + tst3. The resulting inaccuracies are corrected by the calculated safety margins, which are 
added to the grading times.  
Series-connected circuit-breakers: Those so-called “proven grading times” are guiding values. Precise 
information must be obtained from the device manufacturer. 
• Grading between two circuit-breakers with electronic overcurrent releases should be about 70-80 ms 
• Grading between two circuit-breakers with different release types (ETU & TMTU) should be about 
100ms 
• Grading time of 70 ms to 100 ms is necessary between a circuit-breaker and a downstream LV HRC 
fuse. 
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Figure 2.7: Time grading of several series-connected circuit-breakers [3]. 
 
2.4. MV Protection rules 
2.4.1. General protection rules 
The main equipment used for protection of radial MV distribution networks are Circuit Breakers 
controlled by relays and/or fuses. For protection relays the following protection curves are usually used: 
- The overload protection relay is usually inverse time relay (I>, ANSI 51). 
- The short-circuit protection relay (I>>, ANSI 50) for 3-phase and 2-phase short-circuits is usually 
instantaneous or definite time relays. 
- In networks with impedance earthed neutral additional relays are used for single phase to earth short-
circuits, usually with instantaneous time curve (IN>>, ANSI 50N) 
The protection curves for the phase overcurrent protection are shown in Figure 2.8. 
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Figure 2.8: Time grading of several series-connected circuit-breakers. 
Overload protection: The pickup current of inverse-time relay IOC is usually 1.0-1.1 times the maximum 
expected current in the circuit. In the case of MV distribution feeder, where the actual loads are unknown, 
the pickup current is 1.0 – 1.2 times the feeder ampacity. 
There are curves with different slope (moderate inverse, inverse, very inverse, extremely inverse etc.) and 
time delay, and the setting depends on the type of expected load and the thermal limit of protected 
equipment. 
Short-circuit protection: The pickup current ISC of SC protection relay must be lower than the minimum 
short-circuit current expected at the CB point. In distribution feeders the pickup current ISC is 0.8-0.95 times 
the 3-phase short-circuit current at the end of the feeder. 
If the above current is too high, usually the final setting is lower, 2.0-4.0 times the feeder ampacity to 
cover faults with non-zero resistance. 
If the above current is too low (e.g. in very long feeders) the final setting is 1.5-1.8 times the feeder 
ampacity, and the CB SC protection does not protect the whole feeder length. For the unprotected part a fuse 
can be used.   
The time delay of short circuit protection is determined from protection coordination issues. Usually, the 
feeder CB relay has zero or small (300ms) time delay, and the transformer secondary CB relay has additional 
300 ms time delay. Recloser CB have fast and slow time response.  Other types of coordination (eg. 
Blocking signals) is also used. 
In this study, we introduce the term of “partial” loss of protection to describe the cases were only 
the short-circuit protection failed to operate and “full” loss of protection for the case were also the 
overload protection failed.  
2.4.2. Feeder Protection Relay (Main protection) 
Feeder protection relays are used to protect the feeders against overloads and short-circuits, respecting the 
thermal limits of the cables/lines. The settings for the feeder protection relays are defined in relation to the 
minimum expected short-circuit current, which is the case of a 3-phase short circuit at the end of the feeder. 
According to the analysis of Section 2.4.1, the short-circuit setting ISC (I>>, ANSI 50) is defined as 0.9 ∙𝐼&',)*+, while it can vary between 1.5 and 3 times the rated thermal current of the feeder line Ilth. Therefore, 
the overload setting for the feeder protection relay is defined by: 𝐼,&' = 𝑚𝑎𝑥11.5 ∙ 𝐼456,min	(0.9 ∙ 𝐼&',)*+, 3.0 ∙ 𝐼456)>   (2.1) 
Time setting for feeder protection relay is 0 (50ms opening time) 
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2.4.3. Transformer secondary protection relay (Back-up relay): 
Transformer secondary protection relays are used to protect the transformer against overloading and 
short-circuits, as well as provide back-up protection to the feeder protection relays. Back-up protection is 
intended to operate when a power system fault is not cleared or an abnormal condition is not detected in the 
required time because of failure or inability of other protection to operate or failure of the appropriate circuit-
breaker(s) to trip. Utilities install back-up protection to improve the dependability of their fault-clearing 
system. Here, dependability is the probability of not failing to clear a power system fault or abnormality.  
For the back-up protection the relay setting will be 0.9 ∙ 𝐼&',?@A	 _C44, where 𝐼&',?@A	 _C44 is the minimum 
short-circuit current of all feeders which belongs to the transformer secondary network. For coordination 
reasons, minimum setting is 1.5 times the rated current of the transformer Itr, and maximum setting is 3.0 
times Itr. So, the short-circuit relay setting (ISC, Figure 2.8) is given by: 𝐼DE&' = 𝑚𝑎𝑥11.5 ∙ 𝐼5F,min	(0.9 ∙ 𝐼&',?@A	 _C44, 3.0 ∙ 𝐼5F)>   (2.2) 
Back-up protection must be coordinated with the downstream protection devices and is, by definition, 
slower than the feeder/main protection. Hence, time setting for back-up protection relay is 300ms. 
 
2.4.4. Overload protection 
For short-circuit hosting capacity studies, we assume protection CB with only instantaneous or definite 
time relays. If for other studies, we examine also inverse time relays for overload protection, their setting (I1 
Fig. 1) will be equal the rated current (or lime ampacity) of the equipment, and the curve will be of the 
standard inverse type (IEC 60255). 
2.5. LV Protection rules 
2.5.1. Main feeder protection  
LV distribution feeders are protected using fuses, which have an inherent inverse-time protection curve as 
shown in Figure 2.9. As previously stated, the fuses must to protect the downstream cable against 
overcurrents, including both overloads and short-circuit currents. It is important to note that the fuse is much 
less versatile than the protection set composed by a circuit breaker and associated relays because of two 
reasons. The first one is that the time-current curve cannot be parametrized depending on the characteristics 
of the feeder to be protected. The second reason is that the fuse must assure the cable protection for all the 
types of short-circuits involving not only poly-phase (three-phase and phase-to-phase) but also phase-to-
ground faults.  
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Figure 2.9: Two feeder LV benchmark network protection. 
 
Several types of fuses with different technical characteristics adapted for specific protection purposes can 
be found in the market. In the case of protection of LV distribution cables, general purpose fuses (gG) are 
conventionally used with normalized time-current curves according to IEC 60269-2. The main design 
methodology that usually is applied for dimensioning a fuse to protect a given cable can be summarized in 
the following steps: 
1. Overload criterion. The fuse protects the cable against overloads according to IEC 60364-4-43 if the 
following two conditions are satisfied:  𝐼G ≤ 𝐼+ ≤ 𝐼I                                           (2.3) 𝐼J ≤ 1.45	𝐼I                                           (2.4) 
where Ib is the cable design current of the cable, Iz is the cable maximum current (ampacity limit), In 
is the fuse rated current and If is the conventional fusing current for the conventional fusing time. In 
case of gG fuses, it is satisfied that: 
 𝐼J ≤ 1.6	𝐼+                                           (2.5) 
 
Therefore, the rated current of the fuse must verify that: 𝐼+ ≤ M.NOM.P 	𝐼I = 0.9062𝐼I                                          (2.6) 
2. Maximum short-circuit current criterion. The breaking capacity of the fuse must be higher than the 
maximum short-circuit current. This condition is usually satisfied due to the large breaking capacity 
of the LV fuses.  
3. Energy flowing through the fuse before clearing the short-circuit fault must to be lower than the 
maximum energy that the cable can withstand without any damage, mathematically: 𝐼RRS 𝑡)J ≤ 𝐼RRS 𝑡)R                                                                       (2.7) 
It is important to note that the short-circuit current flow through the cable produces a temperature 
raise because of the increase of thermal losses by the Joule effect. It is possible to assume that, from 
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a thermal point of view, the process is adiabatic because the heating is produced almost 
instantaneously, being possible to state that 𝐼RRS 𝑡)R = (𝐾𝑆)S                                                                      (2.8) 
where S is the cross section of the cable and K is a constant depending on the conductor and the 
insulation. Therefore, the cable damage curve can be formulated as: 𝑡R = (W&)XYYZ S                                                                          (2.9) 
The fuse protects the cable if it clears the fault before this time tc as shown in Figure 2.9. It is 
important to note that (4.9) exclusively holds for times below 5 seconds because it is based on the 
assumption of a thermal adiabatic process. For longer times, the process cannot be considered 
adiabatic and the damage curve of the cable cannot be represented in this way. Usually, it is required 
to verify the fulfillment of this condition for the maximum and the minimum short-circuit currents. 
On the one hand, due to the limiting current capability of the fuses, this condition is satisfied for the 
maximum current. This maximum short-circuit current is produced in case of a three-phase short-
circuit fault just downstream the fuse. On the other hand, note that for the minimum short-circuit 
current, and due to the inverse time-current characteristic of the fuse, the fault clearing usually takes 
longer times. For this reason, it is quite important to verify that the fault clearing is produced before 
tc and below 5 seconds. Finally, note that the minimum short-circuit current is produced in case of a 
single-phase-to-ground fault at the end of the feeder protected by the cable.  
According to the aforementioned design methodology, it is clear that the protection of the LV distribution 
system with fuses has some limitations in comparison to the use of automatic circuit breakers. Probably the 
main one is that a fuse only guarantees the protection up to a critical feeder length, i.e. clearing time of the 
minimum short-circuit current equal to 5 seconds. In those situations where the feeder length is longer that 
this critical length the feeder has to be divided into different sections, each one protected with its 
corresponding fuse. Therefore, in these situations it is mandatory to assure the selectivity between the 
installed fuses, which is achieved if the fusing energy (I2t) of the downstream fuse is lower than the pre-arc 
energy (I2t) of the upstream ones.    
 
2.5.2. Back-up feeder protection  
The back-up protection of the fuses, which are the LV feeder main protection, is usually assign to the MV 
protection of the MV/LV transformer. This protection cane be done using either a circuit breaker, including 
its associated relays, or a fuse. Due to economic reasons, secondary substations owned by utilities use fuses 
while circuit breakers are mainly applied in case of private secondary substation. For this reason, it is going 
to be considered that the back-up protection of the LV distribution system is provided by a MV fuse. The 
following criteria is usually applied for selecting this fuse: 
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1. Minimum rated current. This current is adjusted considering that the load of the MV/LV transformer 
is not constant and may withstand some overload without reaching its maximum operating 
temperature (limited by the transformer isolation): 
 1.4𝐼5+ ≤ 𝐼+                                                                      (2.10) 
where Itn is the rated current of the primary transformer side and In is the rated current of the fuse. 
2. Inrush current. The connection of a power transformer to the grid, even in the case of no-load 
condition, demands a transient high current known as inrush current. This is due to the transient flux 
conditions on the transformer magnetic core and the saturated flux-current characteristic of the 
magnetic materials. The inrush current depends on several factor but mainly on the residual flux and 
the instantaneous voltage applied to the transformer in its connection. This inrush current can be up 
to 10 to 15 times the transformer rated current which is a problem in case of protecting the 
transformer with a fuse. Note that the fuse is not able to distinguish between a short-circuit or an 
inrush current and it is required to assure that the fuse does not melt during the transformer 
connection. Considering that the inrush current is a transient phenomenon, usually it is imposed the 
fuse nonoperation by the following equation: 𝐼J[\*]+(0.1𝑠) > 12𝐼5+                                                      (2.11) 
where Ifusion(0.1s) is the current assuring the fuse melting in 0.1 s.  
3. LV short-circuit current. Considering that the fuse is the back-up protection of the LV main feeder 
fuses, the MV fuse must clear a short-circuit current in the transformer LV side. For this reason, the 
following equation holds: 𝐼+]`J[\*]+(0.1𝑠) < XbcdYY                                                      (2.12) 
where ecc is the transformer short-circuit impedance in per unit.  
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3. Report of problems of protection means due to high penetration of 
DRES 
When controllable DRES units are connected to a distribution network, the system is considered as an 
active distribution network. The DRES in the distribution network will change the total fault current in the 
event of a fault. The change in the fault current level depends on the type, location, and technology of the 
DRESs. The change in fault current can lead to a failure to reach the pick-up value of overcurrent and 
distance relays, cause sympathetic tripping, protection blinding, force unintentional islanding, mal-operation 
of auto-reclosures, and loss of protection coordination in the distribution network. Similarly, in order to 
interrupt the high fault currents the revision of short-circuit interrupting capacity of protection devices may 
also be required. These problems directly affect the safety of equipment, personnel, and continuity of service. 
In the following sections, the key issues that the traditional protection system can face due to the high 
penetration of DRES in the distribution network are briefly described. 
 
3.1. False tripping of protective devices (sympathetic tripping) 
Integration of large scale DRESs in distribution systems results in the bidirectional flow of the fault 
current on most of the feeders/lines. The false tripping of protective devices (or sympathetic tripping) could 
occur in the distribution network when a DRES is close to a fault and it starts participating in fault current 
that reaches the pick limit of the healthy feeder and causes tripping of a healthy part of the network. The 
basic principle of false tripping is shown in Figure 3.1. In this figure, a short-circuit occurs on feeder 1, while 
the DRES unit is connected at the end of feeder 2. If the impedance of line between the fault location and the 
DRES unit is small, a large short-circuit current can be provided in reverse direction by the DRES to the 
fault in feeder 1. This short-circuit current can overload feeder 2 and lead to tripping of the entire feeder. 
False tripping is typically caused due to the presence of synchronous generators in the distribution network, 
because they are capable of feeding sustained large short-circuit currents [1]. In big interconnected 
distribution systems, a few relays may experience fault levels greater than their pickup value and may trip 
before the desired primary/backup relays, which results in isolation of a larger portion of the network. 
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Figure 3.1: False tripping due to distribution generation. 
 
3.2. Protection blinding 
A distribution grid scenario of protection blinding is shown in Figure 3.2. In the traditional distribution 
network, if a three-phase fault occurs at point F1, while the DRES is disconnected from the main grid, the 
over-current relay detects the short circuit current and trips the feeder to remove the fault from the electrical 
power network. However, in the case that the DRES is connected to the feeder and the same fault occurs at 
F1, the DRES also contributes to the fault current, resulting in a reduced fault current from the grid. The 
severity of this condition also depends on the impedance between the relay and the DRES [5], which in turn 
determines the magnitude of the fault current. In case of a decreased fault current from the grid, the over-
current element of protection may not be able to detect the fault to send a trip signal to the breaker. This 
condition is called protection blinding. If such a condition persists in the distribution grid, it will lead to 
equipment damage [6]. 
 
Figure 3.2: Protection blinding in distribution feeder. 
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3.3. Increase and decrease in short-circuit levels 
The contribution of a single inverter-interfaced DRES to the fault current is not high enough to initiate the 
protection setting. However, the aggregated contribution of a large number of DRESs in the distribution 
network can cause protection system malfunction and lead to the overall failure of protection coordination. 
The increase or decrease in short circuit-currents due to DRES can cause a problem between fuse to relay or 
fuse to fuse coordination that would be a great concern for reliability and safety of the distribution network. 
In this context, the protection system might require adjustment of the protection setting, replacement or 
installation of extra relays. Especially in the case of an increase in fault current the verification of 
interruption capacity of the breaker or even change in protection schemes might be required [7]. 
 
Figure 3.3: Ineffective use of overcurrent protection. 
If the fault occurs in the distribution system operating in islanded mode (Figure 3.3), the inverter- 
interfaced DRES cannot provide short circuit current more than 2-3 times its rated current. This insufficient 
short circuit current contribution from inverter interfaced DRES cannot reach the pickup level of overcurrent 
protection relay that would lead to ineffective use of overcurrent protection in distribution network [8][7]. 
 
3.4. Undesirable network islanding 
In the case of a fault within a distribution network with extensive DRES penetration, where generation 
and demand are balanced, it is possible to maintain an islanded operation mode disconnected from the main 
upstream power grid. The islanded condition can occur due to false tripping of a protection relay. As shown 
in Figure 3.4, if the fault current sensed by the R2 is sufficient enough to actuate breaker tripping signal, it 
will lead to the islanded operation of the network, where DRES will keep powering load 3 and load 4 [9]. If 
the distribution network is not designed to operate in island mode, it can cause following issues [1]: 
• Reconnection of the islanded part becomes complicated, especially when automatic recloser is 
used.  
DG
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• It can lead to damage to equipment and can decrease the reliability of the power network. 
• The network operator cannot guarantee the power quality in the island-operated network. 
Safety problems to maintenance personnel arise if the network is energized by power back-fed from the 
DRES. 
 
Figure 3.4: Islanding in distribution feeder. 
 
Therefore, if one or more phases are disconnected from the grid, the DRES should also be rapidly 
disconnected from the network. The anti-islanding protection is used to disconnect the DRES in case of 
islanding condition. However, this kind of protection scheme is tough to be accomplished by the basic under-
/over-voltage and under-/over-frequency relays, because they may fail to operate if the power mismatch on 
the island is minimal [1]. 
 
3.5. Coordination and protection issues of reclosers 
The protection architecture of the power system is designed to isolate the minimum part of the system 
affected by a fault in order to maximize the quality of service to the final users. This characteristic is satisfied 
in radial distribution systems by applying selectivity criteria between overcurrent relays. The basic principle 
is that the upstream protections must respond later than the downstream ones for the same fault current. The 
fault current contribution by DRES in distribution network can cause sequential false operation of protection 
relays from downstream to upstream feeders. The false tripping of protection relays in a cascaded manner is 
known as loss of protection coordination. 
Rural distribution systems are mainly composed of overhead lines which are prone to temporary faults 
due to either adverse climate conditions (lighting, rain, snow) and accidental line contacts with animals or 
trees. In these temporary faults, when the fault arc is interrupted the fault can heal itself without any outside 
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intervention. It has been noticed that 70-80% of all faults that take place in distribution systems are 
temporary [10]. For this reason, automatic reclosing is usually applied in rural areas for managing temporary 
fault clearing. It is interesting to note that one of the relevant hypothesis for the automatic reclosing is that 
only one source contributes to the fault current which is clearly satisfied in case of radial passive systems. 
Obviously, this is not the case when DRES are connected to the distribution system because, even in the case 
of circuit breaker opening, the fault can be still supplied by DRES, thus there is no guarantee of fault 
clearing. In the presence of DRESs in the distribution grids two are the main issues caused by the action of 
reclosers: 
Out of synchronism operation of reclosers: When the circuit breaker of the reclosing sequence is open 
for the dead time, the DRES in the network usually tends to drift away from the synchronism with the 
grid. If the reconnection is made without any synchronization, which is the usual the way, this may cause 
serious damages to the DRES and load connected with the power network. If the DRES units are rotating 
generators, the out of synchronism operation of reclosers could produce high electromechanical torques in 
DRES, which could damage them. The out of synchronism operation of reclosers can lead to transient 
overvoltage, due to the different voltage phase angles. The overvoltage can cause high inrush current in 
the connected transformer and also damage feeder devices and customer installations [11]. (Figure 3.5) 
 
Figure 3.5: Out of the synchronism operation of reclosers. 
 
Loss of protection coordination: Usually, the radial distribution feeders have been designed with 
protection coordination between the reclosers and fuses to reduce the power outage in case of temporary 
faults. The coordination between fuses and reclosers is designed to make sure that only the faulted area of 
the network is isolated and healthy part of network is kept energized, in order to increase the power 
reliability to the customers. This protection coordination can only operate between the designed fault 
current boundaries (If,min – If,max), therefore it is necessary that the majority of fault currents should lies 
between this fault current limits. If the fault current is provided by both the source (grid) and the DRES 
unit (Figure 3.6), the recloser can see only the fault current from the source, which will be less than total 
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fault current through the fuse. The fuse can blow before the recloser operates and it can permanently 
remove the load from the grid, even the cause of the fault is intermittent [12]. 
 
Figure 3.6: Protection coordination failure in distribution feeder. 
 
 
3.6. Reduction of reach of protection devices 
 
The radial distribution feeders are protected with overcurrent relays. If the DRES installed in distribution 
feeder has large fault current capacity, the fault current seen by the feeder overcurrent protection relay will 
be reduced. This protection deficiency in the distribution network is called reduction of reach. 
 
Figure 3.7: Reduction of reach of protective devices [7]. 
 
This problem is shown in Figure 3.7, where there is a fault at the lateral end of the distribution feeder with 
the large DRES. The fault current injected by DRES (I2) will be larger than the fault current (I1) provided by 
the grid. The relay R0, which is designed to protect the whole feeder will see higher fault impedance due to 
small fault current through the grid and can missoperate. This condition becomes severe if the fault is at the 
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very end of the line. The fault current contribution by the grid will be even smaller. Therefore, R0 will not be 
able to detect it, due to high fault impedance seen. This undetected fault can damage the power distribution 
line [13]. 
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4. Protection methods for distribution systems embedding RES 
The previous section has evidenced the problems that RES may create in the conventional protection 
system of the distribution network. For this reason, this section is devoted to outline the main existing trends 
in the specialized literature to guarantee the protection [14]. Basically, the proposed methodologies can be 
classified within three groups. The first one is composed of these methodologies, which modify the existing 
protective philosophy to cope with the RES integration within the distribution system by applying alternative 
conventional protective methodologies. Different alternatives can be found within this group: 
• Voltage-based protection [15]. In this methodology, all the RES units are continuously monitoring the 
voltage at their point of interconnection (POI). If this value is below a previously set threshold, it is 
interpreted that a short circuit fault happens close to the RES unit and, therefore the control algorithm 
reduce the RES current contribution to the fault.  The method does not consider the short-circuit current 
and exclusively relies on local voltage measurements. This may have some advantages but it is clear 
that any voltage transient produced by any other action, like load switching or energization of 
transformer, can be interpreted as a short-circuit fault. In addition, the method does not guarantee the 
selectivity of the protective system because it exclusively relies on local voltage measurements.  
• Distance protection [16]. This is the traditional system protection scheme used in transmission systems, 
which are from the beginning meshed and active and, therefore, bidirectional power flows are usual. 
The main underlying idea is to define different protection zones considering the relative position of the 
RES units. However, the main disadvantage of this methodology is that the particular characteristic of 
distribution system, which are composed by several sections with heterogeneous lengths and quite 
reduced X/R ratios, make its application extremely difficult. Moreover, it has to be considered that the 
impedance estimation of the distance relay depends on the RES production.  
• Differential protection [17],[18],[19]. The differential protection is based on the simultaneous 
measurement of the current at both ends of a feeder section. If this current difference is above a 
threshold it is interpreted as a short-circuit fault inside the protected zone. This protection philosophy is 
able to detect any fault inside the protected zone within a short time being not affected by the RES. 
However, it has to be considered that this is not an economic solution as it requires a communication 
link between the extremes of the protection line to perform the current comparison.  
• Directional overcurrent protection [20],[21]. This protective relay, in addition to measuring the current 
requires a voltage measurement to compute the direction of the current. Note that this is suitable for 
active distribution systems because the short circuit currents can be supplied from different sources.  
Therefore, this protection philosophy can be used to determine the faulted feeder and avoid the 
sympathetic tripping. Note that in case of the short-circuit fault F2, if the relay R1 is equipped with a 
directional overcurrent protection, it can be determined that the short-circuit current flows in the reverse 
direction which means that the short circuit is in a parallel feeder.  
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The second group approaches the problem in a different way, trying to mitigate the adverse behavior of 
RES in case of short-circuit faults. Note that all the protection problems in active distribution networks are 
mainly caused by the contribution of DRESs to fault current. For this reason, the strategies within this group 
focus on eliminating or reducing the DRES contribution to the fault. Different alternatives can be found 
within this group: 
• Application of fault current limiters [22], [23], [24], [25]. A fault current limiter is a series non-linear 
device because its impedance is not constant and depends on the current flowing through it. In case of 
normal currents, the fault current limiter ideally behaves as a short circuit with almost null impedance. 
Conversely, in case of short-circuit currents its impedance is quite large producing a reduction of it. The 
use of fault current limiters associated to RES may reduce their contribution to the short circuit and 
prevent the miscoordination of conventional overcurrent relays.  
• Disconnection of RES in case of fault [26], [27], [28]. This protective methodology proposes to 
disconnect all the RES in case of any perturbation in voltage of frequency. In this way, the conventional 
protective system will not be disrupted by the DRES contributions and, because of the disconnection it 
should be possible to guarantee the coordination of the system. However, this protective philosophy has 
several disadvantages in case of a RES massive penetration. On the one hand, RES will be tripped in 
case of experiencing a voltage drop irrespective if they are located or not within the faulted feeder. On 
the other hand, and considering a near future scenario in which RES may supply an important part of the 
distribution load, this solution is no longer valid from the reliability and quality of service points of 
view [29].  
The third group is composed by futuristic methodologies, which take advantage of the new developments 
in the field of communication technologies and adaptive systems. The importance of these methodologies 
justify to consider them in the next section of this document.  
Considering the above described problems, it is not surprising that reliable fault detection and handling is 
of primary concern for modern power grids. Especially the use of the ever-evolving information and 
communication technology (ICT) promises to help achieving that goal. In the specialized literature, it is 
possible to find a wide array of ICT-based protection systems, ranging from classical protection schemes that 
are improved through ICT, to novel techniques that use emerging technologies like Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) to achieve their goal.  
Thus, the purpose of this section is to give an overview on different kinds of ICT-based fault detection 
and protection schemes, by presenting some selected papers that were proposed over the last few years. The 
questions the survey should answer include:  
• What is the main purpose of the scheme and how does it achieve it?  
• For which kind of grid configuration is it applicable?  
• Are there any requirements from ICT side (if specified)?  
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• What are the benefits of using this system?  
In order to get some structure into the different schemes, they are categorized according to the 
methodology used by Buigues et al. [30]: 
• Adaptive protection systems mainly rely on the use of adaptive relays, which can have their settings 
(like for example their tripping threshold) changed on the fly, in order to adapt to changes in the power 
grid [28]. A communication network is usually used to transmit commands to the relevant relays. 
Adaptive Systems are mainly proposed for microgrids, [31]-[33], in order to react to changes of grid 
topology (e.g. from grid-connected to islanded mode), but are also considered for conventional 
distribution grids by some authors, [34]-[35], as they can also react to the intermittent nature of RES. 
Most of the adaptive methods have the following commons elements: 
o A central unit for continuous monitoring of the operational parameters of the protected system such 
as current and voltage. 
o An algorithm developed in the central unit to recognize the structure of the network by analysing 
key data such status of circuit breakers and RES. 
o A methodology to compute the most adequate protection settings based on the operational 
conditions.  
o A communication infrastructure to connect the central controller with the protective devices.  
Evidently, the core of any adaptive system is the algorithm used to compute the relay settings, 
being possible to classify them in two big groups: 
o Mathematical algorithms usually based either on graph methods [36] or optimization techniques 
[37]. The main disadvantage of these methods is that they must be executed after any change in the 
distribution network condition and their computational cost is really high [30]. 
o Artificial intelligence methods which will be analyzed within this section.  
However as pointed out in [30], there are some problems regarding the implementation of such systems 
that need to be considered. The need for a sufficient communication infrastructure may be high, as most of 
the proposed techniques use some kind of centralized controller that handles the decision-making regarding 
relay settings. And lastly, the costs involved for upgrading all the different protection devices in the system. 
Brahma and Girgis propose in [34] an adaptive protection scheme for high RES penetration levels in a 
distribution grid. Its aim is to allow the reliable isolation of faults despite high RES penetration, while also 
trying to keep the RES connected. In order to achieve this, the grid is divided in separate zones, each with a 
similar number of loads and RES. These zones are connected by breakers that have remote communication 
capability. A central relay at the local substation can control these breakers, as well as RES relays, in order to 
isolate faults. In order to detect faults, the relay continuously collects current phasor data from phasor 
measurement units (PMUs) located at RES site, as well as the current direction at the breakers. The 
communication medium is not further specified. Through performing load flow and short circuit analysis and 
then comparing the results to the measured currents, faults can be detected and isolated. The system was 
simulated on a radial distribution feeder. The results showed a detection accuracy of up to 98% for high RES 
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penetration. However, for lower RES penetration the accuracy decreased sharply because of the low PMU 
measurement availability. It has to be noted that this scheme does not take into account islanding scenarios, 
so it would need to be adjusted for this purpose. Singh et al. developed in [35] a two-phase protection 
scheme for the adaptive protection coordination of power networks which is depicted in Figure 4.1 In the 
first phase (off-line mode) all possible grid operational topologies are identified. Using a differential search 
algorithm nonlinear optimization method, optimal relay settings are derived for the different topologies. In 
the second phase (on-line mode) a fuzzy-based adaptive technique determines the correct topology and sends 
the corresponding setting to the relays. For doing so, it is required to continuously monitor the state of the 
grid for updating the settings of overcurrent and distance relays. The scheme was simulated on a modified 
medium voltage IEEE 8 bus and 14 bus system. The results showed high viability of the scheme for quickly 
changing network topologies, e.g. through the intermittent feed-in of RES. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Topology-based adaptive protection system proposed in [35]. 
The work of Ustun et al. [32] takes a similar topology-based approach as the above, but specifically 
focuses on microgrids. It not only considers the RES connection status, but also the fact whether the 
microgrid is islanded or not. Based on these variables, the fault currents of connected relays are updated 
dynamically. The scheme employs a central protection unit, that is contacted on an interrupt basis in case the 
grid topology changes, as depicted in Figure 4.2. Then the controller computes new fault currents based on 
the connected generators’ fault current contribution, which is estimated at 1.2 times the rated RES current. 
Those updated settings are sent to each relay over a not further specified communication network. In order to 
improve the selectivity, each relay also employs a trip delay time, that increases hierarchically in the 
microgrid. If a fault is not cleared within this time, the relay trips automatically. The paper proposes that this 
delay time could also be updated dynamically just like the fault current levels but does not implement it. All 
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in all, the main advantage of the proposed system is the plug and play characteristic for DERs, as well as the 
robustness to communication issues, as trip decisions are made locally by the relays. 
 
Figure 4.2: Interruption-based protection scheme proposed in [32]. 
 
• Differential protection systems use coupled differential directional relays, in order to locate and isolate 
faults, by comparing measurements from different parts of the grid as previously outlined. In spite that 
they have been extensively used in protection applications of transmission systems, they have been also 
applied to distribution networks where can be found either as centralized (based on a central controller 
that monitors and coordinates) or decentralized (based on local relay communication). While centralized 
might provide more accurate results, the increased time delay makes it less suited for a time-critical task 
such as fault handling [31]. Thus, local decentralized schemes provide the best compromise between 
accuracy and speed. However, the reliance on the communication system can lead to some issues. In 
case the ICT system fails, the protection scheme might fail as well, so a way of local backup protection 
is needed. Another requirement is the synchronization of measurements, as with the time-critical fault 
handling, accuracy is of high importance [30]. Casagrande et. al propose in [38] to use a decentralized 
differential approach for isolated microgrids with converter-interfaced RES, where a data mining 
approach is used to identify the most efficient parameters to use. From local measurements of voltage 
and current time series at relay-site a feature extraction process, based on an Information Gain metric, 
selects parameters like symmetrical components, total harmonic distortion, magnitude and phase angles 
of current and voltage. This reduces the redundancy of data and makes a trade-off between classification 
accuracy and performance. The relay also continuously receives the features from remote relays, which 
are then differentiated with local values and fed into a statistical classifier that decides whether a fault 
occurred or not as shown in Figure 4.3. This classifier follows a machine learning procedure using a 
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random forest technique. Each decision tree in a forest decides independently based on a training data 
set and then a majority vote is made to detect a fault. The scheme was simulated in a LV isolated facility 
microgrid with micro-processor-based RES. No specification regarding the communication channel was 
made and it was assumed that delay and possible errors were not significant. The results of the 
simulation showed a classification accuracy of up to 100% with the remark that using the feature 
selection process makes the scheme more effective than classical differential arrays. Further, it was 
shown that communication between neighboring relays is far more efficient than over long range which 
is quite convenient to reduce the network traffic drastically. 
 
Figure 4.3: Differential relay scheme proposed in [38]. 
A different approach to a differential protection system was conducted by Sortomme et al. in [39]. They 
presented a protection scheme using digital relays with a communication network for microgrids, while also 
considering different grid topologies (radial, looped) and also taking into account high impedance faults. 
Their scheme is based on the deployment of programmable digital distribution feeder relays at each end of a 
line segment as shown in Figure 4.4. The relays sample absolute current at 16 times per cycle and send it to 
the other side of the line via Ethernet or optical fiber. If the absolute values of two samples at a relay is above 
a predefined threshold, it trips. Further it is specified that for line length under 18 miles the communication 
and processing delay is low enough that no synchronization is required. Above 18 miles the use of 
synchronized measurements via PMUs is advised, following what it is also proposed in [40]. In the event of 
a failure of the differential technique, a backup protection scheme is proposed that switches all other relays 
to comparative voltage mode. High impedance faults are also analysed in this work being proposed two 
actions: (i) the use of current transformers able to sense down to 10% of nominal current and can thus also 
detect low fault currents,; (ii) relay programming to recognize certain high impedance fault characteristics, 
which the paper models in a stochastic manner. The modeled high impedance fault resistance ranges from 50 
to 1000 Ω and varies in a timescale from 10 μs to 5 ms. The system was simulated in a 18 bus distribution 
system with RES and was tested in 4 different topologies (radial islanded, radial grid-connected, looped 
islanded and looped grid connected). For all these topologies the system could adequately isolate all faults, 
even for high impedance faults with currents as low as 10 % of nominal current. However, this reliability is 
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achieved by employing so many relays, which is financially infeasible. The work concludes that a centralized 
scheme with less relays might be a more cost-effective alternative. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Differential relay scheme proposed in [39]. 
Prasai et al. developed a communication-based protection scheme for microgrids with meshed topology in 
[41] which make fault handling even more challenging. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to localize faults 
quickly as due to the inherent characteristics of such distribution systems line impedances can be small and 
many branches may experience approximately the same level of fault current. For this purpose, Power Line 
Communication (PLC) is used to transmit current magnitude and direction from each bus breaker to the end 
of the opposite line. In case there is a mismatch between the two magnitudes, it is assumed there is a fault on 
the line and the breakers trip. The authors claim this way high impedance faults can also be detected. As 
communication can be prone to disturbance, a 3-layer communication scheme is proposed. The first layer is 
for working communication. The second layer activates if there is a communication error during fault 
handling. Then the line between the communication partners is tripped. If a communication error happens 
before a fault is recognized, the data is simply routed around the meshed grid to the original destination. For 
the case that all communication in the whole grid fails, the third layer backup protection activates and 
disconnects all breakers after a specific time delay. A supervisory controller then tries to restore the system 
to its original state. This system was tested by simulating a meshed power grid with line to line faults.  
Lastly, Che et. al in [31] combined the principles of adaptive and differential systems to provide an effective 
hierarchical protection scheme for looped microgrids, implemented by communication assisted digital relays. 
A master controller senses the topology of the microgrid and communicates the updated settings to each 
relay. On a local level, adjacent directional relays are connected through fiber and use a differential scheme 
to detect line faults together. The criterion to trip is for both coupled relays to detect positive directional fault 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
07/06/2020 16:42:36 EEST - 137.108.70.13
   36 
 
 
current, which means the fault occurred between them. Each loop feeder also employs a non-directional relay 
that react slower than the local ones and should prevent nuisance tripping. The system is tested in a simulated 
4.16 kV microgrid with several distribution loops. A synchronous generator provides sufficient fault current 
for the overcurrent protection strategy. The scheme is performed in islanded mode as well as grid connected, 
by applying single-phase-to-ground faults at different sections of the loop. The simulation results showed 
that the system is capable to detect and isolate faults for the specified settings. 
• Artificial intelligence based algorithms prove to be another way to detect faults, as they provide 
excellent pattern recognition capabilities and are resilient to noise [42], [43]. That way, various types of 
faults, even the high impedance ones, can be reliably detected by simply feeding actual fault data into 
the algorithm. There are several approaches to artificial neural network (ANN) based fault detection in 
literature. Generally, a neural network can be described as a graph comprised of several layers as shown 
in Figure 4.5. The first layer is called input layer, receiving data from outside the neural network. It is 
connected to the first hidden layer via weighted links. An arbitrary number of hidden layers may follow, 
each connected via a number of weighted links to the previous hidden layer. The final layer of the 
neural network is called output layer, passing results to outside the network. The nodes, or neurons, of 
the artificial neural network are activated according to an activation function which usually is a non-
linear function, e.g. the sigmoid function 𝑆(𝑥) = 1 (1 + 𝑒`g)⁄ . 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Schematic representation of a neural network. 
Zadeh uses an ANN to specifically detect high impedance faults in [42]. It uses as input signals the 
second and third harmonic components of residual current, residual voltage and residual impedance which 
are measured at the relay location, so there is no communication requirement in this case. The output of the 
neural network determines whether there is a fault or not. Several different configurations of hidden layers 
were tested. The training was performed using the Marquardt-Levenberg algorithm. The system was 
simulated with a meshed MV distribution network. The author claims that his approach results in a more 
reliable scheme for detection of high impedance faults with non-linear arcing resistance for distribution lines. 
It also reduces the effect system variables such as source impedance have on the detection scheme. Jamil et 
al. use an ANN to detect and classify faults in electrical power transmission systems in [43]. It is important 
to differentiate between the various fault types, as they have differing pre- and post-fault conditions, which 
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the ANN needs to learn. Three phase currents and voltages of one end of the transmission line are used as 
inputs for that. The ANN architecture for fault detection uses 6-10-5-3-1 neurons in the respective layers. For 
the classification problem, the neural network is modified to have 4 outputs, signifying a fault on the 
respective phase or ground line with a layer configuration of 6-38-4. The authors use backpropagation neural 
networks with a data monitoring frequency of 1 kHz. The scheme is simulated with a 400 kV transmission 
line system with generators at the ends and is tested with line to ground faults. The results showed sufficient 
fault detection rates for this kind of fault. Although the proposed scheme is for transmission networks, the 
author claimed that it can also be extended to distribution systems. Hubana et al. also specifically target the 
detection and classification of high impedance faults in MV distribution grids, by using the Discrete Wavelet 
Transform (DWT) and ANNs in [44]. A wavelet transform is a type of linear transformation from time to 
frequency domain. In other words, it decomposes data into its frequency components and allows for a 
separate analysis of each “block”. Applying wavelet transform to power grid fault detection allows for 
analysis of voltage and current signals at different frequencies. The figure below shows how the system 
works. Measurement equipment in the grid sends 3-phase voltage data to a controller with DWT-ANN 
software. Based on these measurements, the trained ANN can recognize the right type of fault and send trip 
commands to circuit breakers accordingly. The proposed algorithm is tested by simulation in a radial 10 kV 
distribution system based on a real part of the Bosnian grid. Various phase to ground faults were performed 
on an underground cable ranging from 20 – 600 Ω of fault resistance. The results showed an accurate 
detection and classification for high impedance faults in this range. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Algorithm for fault detection proposed in [44].  
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As the conducted review of ICT-based and AI-based methods showed, there are various approaches to 
use ICT for fault detection and isolation purposes. Those ICT methods can help to solve the problems that 
come with the high RES penetration in distribution grids. Adaptive systems can be used to react to sudden 
grid topology changes, especially in the context of microgrids with converter interfaced RES. Differential 
systems, on the other hand, can help with the localization of faults, to alleviate the issues imposed by bi-
directional power flow. Novel techniques such as ANNs can also help the detection of faults by learning 
from test data. This way it is even possible to detect high impedance faults, that are otherwise hardly 
detectable. However, it is also important to keep in mind costs and risks of those ICT methods. The fact that 
most reviewed papers did not explicitly specify the required ICT infrastructure, makes an assessment 
difficult however. As communication can fail and fault protection must be reliable, there needs to be some 
kind of backup scheme that can provide fault protection also on a local level. Also, as there are currently no 
commercially available relays on the market that support those schemes on the fly, significant investments 
would need to be made to employ them in a big scale. An underlying communication link that provides 
adequate properties like bandwidth and reliability is required, which can also be a problem, especially in 
rural regions. However, with the advance of smart grid technologies this might change in the future. Finally, 
Table 1 presents a general overview of the advantages and disadvantages of the reviewed methodologies for 
protecting active distribution networks with high RES penetration [14]. 
 
Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages of the protection methods for active distribution systems. 
Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Voltage-based Insensitive to current variations 
Operation in voltage transients 
High impedance faults not detected 
No selectivity 
Distance Backup protection for neighbour sections 
Depending on the RES status 
Low accuracy for short feeder sections 
Directional overcurrent Suitable for RES Delayed operation for backup protection 
Fault current limiting Conventional protective system remains Fault limiting technology is not mature 
RES disconnection Conventional protective system remains Not applicable for high RES penetration 
Adaptive protection 
Adequate settings for each network 
status 
High impedance fault detection 
Communication link cost 
Computational cost for setting 
computation 
Differential protection 
High sensitivity 
High impedance faults detected 
Selectivity 
Insensitive to current flow direction 
Communication link cost 
Backup protection required 
Artificial intelligence High impedance faults detected 
Representative training sets required 
Not usual methodology in the business 
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5. Fault current calculation for protection impact 
5.1. Fault current calculation according to IEC60909 
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization 
comprising all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The first edition issued for 
short circuit calculation was the IEC 909 Standard in 1988. This was a derivative work taken from the 
German Verband Deutscher Electrotechniker (VDE) Standard VDE0102. In 2001, a renewed version IEC 
60909 has been published and has been acknowledged as the accepted European standard for calculation of 
symmetrical and unsymmetrical faults. IEC 60909-0 2016 is the most recent edition issued in 2016 [45]. This 
version cancels and replaces the 2001 edition. The major technical changes included with respect to the 
previous edition are: a) contribution of wind power station units to the short-circuit current; b) contribution 
of power station units with full size converters to the short-circuit current. This standard applies to all 
voltages up to 550 kV three-phase systems operating at nominal frequency (50 or 60 Hz). 
The IEC defines an equivalent voltage source as an ideal source applied at the short circuit location for 
calculating the short circuit current. This equivalent voltage source is the only active voltage of the system, 
where all other active voltages in the system are short-circuited. All network feeders, synchronous and 
asynchronous machines are replaced by their internal impedances. This equivalent voltage source is derived 
as follows:  𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 = 𝑐 ∙ 𝑈+/√3     (5.1) 
where the c is the voltage factor (depends on system nominal voltage) and 𝑈𝑛 is the system nominal voltage. 
For calculating the maximum short-circuit current, the IEC adds the sum of the contributions of the full-
converter power station units to the initial short circuit current, to the maximum initial symmetrical short-
circuit current calculated without the contribution of the source currents of the power stations with full size 
converter. The maximum initial three-phase short circuit current (𝐈𝐤") is given by: 															𝐼yzz = M{| R∙}c√~ + M{| ∑ 𝑍* ∙ 𝐼\y,+M ⇒	 					 	 	 (5.2)																							𝐼yzz = 𝐼y,zz + 𝐼y,zz 	 	 	 	 	 			(5.3)	
where IskPFj is the rms value of the maximum source current (positive-sequence system) in case of three-
phase short-circuit at the high-voltage side of the converter unit transformer, given by the manufacturer; Zii, 
Zij are the absolute values of the elements of the nodal impedance matrix of the positive-sequence system, 
where i is the short-circuit node and j are the nodes where power station units with full size converters are 
connected; IkPFO" is the maximum initial symmetrical short-circuit current without the influence of power 
station units with full size converter; and IkPF" is the sum of the contributions of power station units with full 
size converter to the initial short-circuit current. 
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5.2. Problem formulation in a two-feeder benchmark network 
In order to investigate the impact of the DRES penetration on the overcurrent protection means within a 
distribution grid, the fault currents are calculated in a two-feeder benchmark network. The topology of this 
network is shown in Figure 5.1 The current calculations are performed according to the Standard IEC 
60909/2016, exemplarily in case of a three-phase short circuit. Calculations can be extended to 
asymmetrical faults as well. By calculating the fault current contribution from the upstream grid, protection 
issues like protection blinding, recloser-fuse coordination and sympathetic tripping can be predicted. Four 
different scenarios are examined, consisting either of directly-coupled or converter-interfaced DRES, at 
different locations within the grid. The impact of the installed DRES capacity, the distance from the main 
bus (Bus_1) and the upstream grid short-circuit capacity is examined. The grid parameters are given in 
Table 2. 
 
Figure 5.1: Two-feeder benchmark network. 
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Table 2: Two-feeder Benchmark Grid Parameters 
PARAMETER VALUE 
Upstream grid short circuit capacity (MVA) 100 … 500 
Upstream grid R/X ratio 0.1  
Transformer ratio (kV) 110/20 
Transformer power (MVA) 25 
Transformer short-circuit voltage uk 12% 
Transformer cooper losses (kW) 25 
DRES rated power (MVA) 1 … 10  
Synch. Gen sub-transient reactance (pu) 0.2 
Cable type NA2XS2Y 
Cable cross-section (mm2) 120 
Cable positive seq. resistance (Ω/km) 0.501  
Cable positive seq. reactance (Ω/km) 0.716  
Cable Length d1 (km) 1… 10 
Cable Length d2 (km) 1… 10 
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5.2.1. Protecting the two feeder MV benchmark grid 
Initially, in order to examine and quantify the impact of DRES installation in distribution networks, rules 
for determining the protection settings of each protection device must be established. The general rules have 
been presented in Section 2.4. For the following analysis, the Current vs Time protection curve contains two 
elements; an inverse time for the overload (ANSI 51) and the instantaneous for the short-circuit protection 
(ANSI 50). Each protection relay within the two-feeder benchmark grid has different settings, which are 
determined by the protected equipment and the position within the grid. 
 
a) Feeder protection relay R1/R2. 
The feeder ampacity Ilth=285A. This is the setting for the inverse-time overload protection. The minimum 
short-circuit current is calculated for a 3-phase short-circuit at the end of the feeder (Bus 3, length 10km) and 
is equal to Isc,min = 1109A. According to Section 2.4, short-circuit current setting for main feeder protection 
Relay R1/R2 is:  𝐼,&' = 𝑚𝑎𝑥11.5 ∙ 𝐼456,min	(0.9 ∙ 𝐼&',)*+, 3.0 ∙ 𝐼456)> = 𝑚𝑎𝑥[428,min	(998, 855)] (5.4) 𝐼,&' = 855	𝐴      (5.5) 
And the time delay is set equal to the minimum value tR1 = 0.0msec.  
 
b) Transformer/back-up protection relay R0. 
Transformer rated current is Itr=722A. This is the setting for the inverse-time overload protection. We 
assume feeder 1 the longest feeder, so Isc,min_all = 1109A.  Short-circuit current setting for Relay R0 is:  𝐼DE&' = 𝑚𝑎𝑥11.5 ∙ 𝐼5F,min	(0.9 ∙ 𝐼&',?@A	 _C44, 3.0 ∙ 𝐼5F)> = 𝑚𝑎𝑥[1083,min	(998, 2166)]  (5.6) 𝐼DE&' = 1083𝐴      (5.7) 
The time delay is set equal to 300.00ms. 
The above protection settings are summarized in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Protection curves for main/feeder and transformer/back-up protection of the two-feeder benchmark grid. 
 
5.2.2. Case A: Directly-Coupled Synchronous Generator in Feeder 2  
In the first case, the effect of a directly-coupled generator installed at Bus 4 of feeder 2 is examined. 
Although a Synchronous Generator (SG) is considered in the following analysis, results are also valid for 
asynchronous (induction) generators as well. The distance between the point of installation of the SG and Bus 
1 is d2, while the fault takes place at feeder 1 (distance d1 from Bus 1). Figure 5.3(a) shows the examined 
grid topology, while Figure 5.3(b) the equivalent circuit. The circuit is formed by the impedances of the 
various elements and an equivalent voltage source at the fault location. 
Using the impedance matrix, it is possible to calculate the short-circuit current at the fault location. 
Initially, the admittance matrix of the network is formed: 
𝑌 =  M{{|b + M{Z + M{{ − M{Z− M{Z M{Z             (5.8) 
And the impedance matrix is calculated as the inverse of the admittance matrix: 𝑍 = 𝑌` M              (5.9) 
From equation (5.9), the total initial short circuit current (according to the Standard IEC60909), is given by: 𝐼yzz = M.∙}Y√~∙{(S,S)                                           (5.10) 
And the fault contribution of the main grid to short-circuit current is given by: 𝐼&'_F* = 𝐼yzz ∙ {{{{{{|b                          (5.11) 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.3: Case A: Model with directly-coupled SG: a) Grid topology and b) Equivalent circuit. 
 
Finally, the DRES contribution to the short-circuit current is: 𝐼& = 𝐼yzz ∙ {{|b{{{{|b                          (5.12) 
Figure 5.4 (a) and (b) present the effect of the installed DRES in the fault contribution by the upstream 
grid. Figure 5.5(a) and (b) present the respective effect on the total short-circuit current. As can be seen, in 
the case of directly-coupled DRES the fault contribution depends on the short-circuit capacity of the grid, the 
installed DRES power and the relative distance between to point of connection of the DRES and Bus 1. A 
higher installed DRES capacity results to a lower fault current from the upstream grid. However, as the 
distance between the DRES and Bus 1 increases, the impact is significantly smaller.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 5.4: Case A: Upstream grid fault current contribution a) vs short-circuit capacity and DRES power (DRES at 10km) and b) 
vs distance from Bus 1 and DRES power (Sgrid=500MVA). 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.5: Case A: Initial short-circuit current: a) vs short-circuit capacity and DRES power (DRES at 10km) and b) vs distance 
from Bus 1 and DRES power (Sgrid=500MVA). 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.6: Case A: Time-Overcurrent plots for different grid configurations with 10MVA SG. 
 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
07/06/2020 16:42:36 EEST - 137.108.70.13
   45 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.7: Case A: Time-Overcurrent plots for different grid configurations with 5MVA SG. 
 
In all cases feeder 1 protection relay R1 clears the fault with instantaneous response, but the problem of 
“partial” blinding of back-up protection R0 appears. The worst case for back-up protection blinding is the 
one shown in Figure 5.6c and Figure 5.7c, i.e fault in the end of feeder 1 (10 km) and the SG is installed 
close to the main bus (1 km). In the case shown in Figure 5.7c, protection relay R0 trips in 5.8 sec, while in 
the case of Figure 5.6c it does not trip, meaning that we have “full” blinding of the back-up protection. 
The influence of upstream grid SC capacity is also obvious from the conducted test cases. As shown in 
Figure 5.5,  Figure 5.6b and Figure 5.7b, protection blinding is more likely to appear as the short-circuit 
capacity of the upstream grid decreases.  
 
5.2.3. Case B: Directly-Coupled Synchronous Generator in Feeder 1 
In this case, the effect of a directly-coupled SG, installed at Bus 2 of feeder 1, on the main and back-up 
protection is examined. The distance between the point of installation of the DRES and Bus 1 is d1, while the 
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fault takes place at the end of feeder 1. Figure 5.8(a) shows the examined grid topology, while Figure 5.8(b) 
the equivalent circuit. The circuit is formed by the impedances of the various elements and an equivalent 
voltage source at the fault location. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.8:  Case B: Model with directly-coupled SG: a) Grid topology and b) Equivalent circuit. 
 
The maximum initial short-circuit current at the fault location is calculated using the impedance matrix. 
Initially, the admittance matrix of the network is formed: 
𝑌 = 
M{{|b + M{Z − M{Z 0− M{Z M{Z + M{ + M{Z − M{Z0 − M{Z M{Z 
         (5.13) 
And the impedance matrix is calculated as the inverse of the admittance matrix: 𝑍 = 𝑌` M              (5.14) 
From the impedance matrix and according to the Standard IEC60909, the total initial short circuit current 
is given by: 
  𝐼yzz = M.∙}Y√~∙{(~,~)                                          (5.15) 
And the fault contribution of the main grid to short-circuit current is given by: 𝐼&'_F* = 𝐼yzz ∙ {{Z{{{|b = M.∙}Y√~∙{(~,~) ∙ {{Z{{{|b                      (5.16) 
Finally, the DRES contribution to the short-circuit current is: 𝐼& = 𝐼yzz ∙ {{|b{Z{Z{{{|b     (5.17) 
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Figure 5.9 (a) and (b) present the effect of the installed DRES in the fault contribution by the upstream 
grid. As can be seen, in the case of directly-coupled DRES the fault contribution depends from the short-
circuit capacity of the grid, the installed DRES power and the relative distance between to point of 
connection of the DRES and Bus 1. A higher installed DRES capacity results to a lower fault current from 
the upstream grid. However, as the distance between the DRES and Bus 1 increases, initially the upstream 
grid fault contribution decreases to a minimum and then it increases. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.9: Case B: Upstream grid fault current contribution a) vs short-circuit capacity and DRES power and b) vs distance from 
Bus 1. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.10: Case B: Initial short-circuit current: a) vs short-circuit capacity and DRES power and b) vs distance from Bus 1 and 
DRES power. 
This minimum can be found by using equation: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐼&'_F* = 𝑚𝑖𝑛   M.∙}Y√~∙{(~,~) ∙ {{Z{{{|b¡                       (5.18) 
Comparing Case A and Case B, it is obvious that the installation of a directly-coupled SG in feeder 1 affects more 
the upstream grid contribution, compared to the case where the SG in located in feeder 2. 
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5.2.4. Case C: Inverter-interfaced DRES in Feeder 2  
In this case, an inverter-interfaced DRES (e.g. PV) is connected at Bus 4 of feeder 2. The topology and 
the equivalent circuit are depicted in Figure 5.11(a) and (b) respectively. According to the Standard 
IEC60909, the representation of the full-size converters is performed by a current source. In the presence of 
converter-fed DRES the total fault current consists of the contribution of all voltage sources plus the 
contribution of all current sources. Therefore, the total short-circuit current is calculated in three steps. 
• Step 1: calculate the SC contribution 𝐼yXzz  of all voltage source elements 
• Step 2: calculate the SC contribution 𝐼yXXzz  of all current source elements 
• Step 3: calculate the total initial SC current 𝐼yzz = 𝐼yXzz  +𝐼yXXzz  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.11: Case C: Model with converter-interfaced DRES: a) Grid topology and b) Equivalent circuit. 
 
In order to extract the expressions for the total short-circuit current and the fault current contribution by 
the upstream grid, the impedance matrix must by formed.  
𝑌' =  M{{|b + M{Z − M{Z− M{Z M{Z       (5.19) 𝑍' = 𝑌'` M                                   (5.20) 
The first part of the short-circuit current, 𝐼yXzz , is calculated by neglecting all converter-fed DRES: 𝐼yXzz = M.∙}Y√~∙{¢(S,S)       (5.21) 
The second part is related to the feed-in of the converter-interfaced DRES: 𝐼yXXzz = 𝐼'M ∙ {¢(S,M){¢(S,S)          (5.22) 
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where, IC1 is the current fed by the converter-interfaced DRES during the fault. The total initial short-circuit 
current is the sum of the two previous current elements: 𝐼yzz = 𝐼yXzz + 𝐼yXXzz        (5.23) 
Finally, the contribution of the upstream grid to the short-circuit current is calculated by: 𝐼&'_F* = 𝐼yzz − 𝐼'M          (5.24) 
Note that the IEC60909 Standard does not consider complex values for the currents and the calculations 
are performed algebraically. 
Figure 5.12 presents the effect of the installed converter-interfaced DRES in the fault contribution by the 
upstream grid. As it is obvious, in contrast to the previous case, the fault current from the upstream grid is 
not affected by the short-circuit capacity or the point of installation of the DRES. The only parameter that 
affects the grid current is the installed DRES power. The respective variation of the total initial short-circuit 
current is shown in Figure 5.13. In Figure 5.14, the results for different grid configurations with converter-
interfaced DRES are presented.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.12: Case C: Upstream grid fault current contribution a) vs short-circuit capacity and DRES power and b) vs distance from 
Bus 1 and DRES power. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.13: Case C: Initial short-circuit current: a) vs short-circuit capacity and DRES power and b) vs distance from Bus 1 and 
DRES power. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
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(e) 
 
(f) 
Figure 5.14: Case C: Time-Overcurrent plots for different grid configurations with converter-interfaced DRES. 
 
Again, in all cases presented in Figure 5.14, feeder 1 protection relay R1 clears the fault through the 
instantaneous element, but “partial” protection blinding of the back-up protection appears. The worst case is 
the one with the DRES installed close to Bus 1, while the fault takes place at the most remote bus of the grid. 
It is also clear that the higher the larger the DRES penetration, the more likely it is that protection blinding 
will appear.  
 
5.2.5. Case D: Inverter-interfaced DRES in Feeder 1 
In the last scenario, an inverter-interfaced DRES is considered, connected at Bus 2 of feeder 1. The grid 
topology and the equivalent circuit are shown in Figure 5.15. Same as in Case C, in order to calculate the 
fault currents, the three-step procedure is followed. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.15: Case D: Model with two converter-interfaced DRES: a) Grid topology and b) Equivalent circuit. 
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The fault current contribution by each source can be calculated using the impedance matrix (Eq. 5.25), 
which is the inverse of the admittance matrix (Eq. 5.26).  
𝑌£ = 
M{{|b + M{Z − M{Z 0− M{Z M{Z + M{ + M{Z − M{Z0 − M{Z M{Z 
          (5.25) 
𝑍£ = 𝑌£` M      (5.26) 
Initially the short circuit current without the contribution of the converter-fed DRES is calculated as: 
𝐼yXzz = M.M∙}Y√~∙{¤(~,~)       (5.27) 
Converter-fed DRES in feeder 1 contribution to short-circuit current is given by: 
𝐼yXXzz = 𝐼'M ∙ {¤(~,S){¤(~,~)     (5.28) 
where, Ic1 and Ic2 are the initial short circuit currents injected by the converter fed DRES. Finally, the total 
initial short-circuit current is calculated as: 𝐼yzz = 𝐼yXzz + 𝐼yXXzz = M.M∙}Y√~∙{¤(~,~) + 𝐼'M ∙ {¤(~,S){¤(~,~)           (5.29) 
The upstream grid contribution to the short-circuit current is given by: 𝐼&'_F* = 𝐼yzz − 𝐼'M     (5.30) 
Figure 5.16 (a) presents current contribution from the upstream grid in relation to its short-circuit capacity 
and the installed DRES power. The power of DRES in feeder 1 varies from 1MVA to 10MVA, while the 
distance varies from 1km to 9km. Same as in Case C, the variation of the grid short-circuit capacity has only 
a small impact on the fault current from the main grid. However, as shown in Figure 5.16(b), the fault current 
contribution from the upstream grid is heavily affected by the distance d1, between the point of installation 
of the converter-fed DRES in feeder 1 and Bus 1. The closer the DRES is located at Bus 1 the larger the 
effect on the fault current contribution. Figure 5.17 presents the maximum initial short circuit and how it is 
affected by the DRES power, the upstream grid short-circuit capacity and the location of DRES. 
 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
07/06/2020 16:42:36 EEST - 137.108.70.13
   53 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.16: Case D: Upstream grid fault current contribution a) vs short-circuit capacity and DRES power and b) vs distance from 
Bus 1 and DRES power. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.17: Case D: Initial short-circuit:  a) vs short-circuit capacity and DRES power and b) vs distance from Bus 1 and DRES 
power. 
 
5.3. Concentrated vs Distributed RES 
Aim of this section is to investigate whether the impact on the fault current contribution of the upstream grid, hence 
on the protection means, is larger in the case the DRES are distributed within a grid or concentrated at the one location. 
This will be performed by employing the analytical equation derived previously. Three cases are examined; a) the 
DRES are equally distribution in the two feeders (PDRES1=PDRES2=5MVA) and located at the middle of each feeder, b) 
the DRES are concentrated in the middle of feeder 1 (PDRES1=10MVA) and c) the DRES are concentrated in the middle 
of feeder 2 (PDRES2=10MVA). Note that the fault takes place at the end of feeder 1. The results are presented in Figure 
5.18 for converter-interfaced and directly-coupled DRES. As can be noticed, when the DRES are concentrated and 
located at different feeder in respect to the feeder where the fault takes place, the impact on the upstream grid fault 
current contribution is larger. The impact of directly-coupled SG is approximately double compared to the impact of 
converter-interfaced DRES with the same power. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.18:  Concentrated vs Distributed RES a) Converter-interfaced DRES and b) Directly-coupled SG. 
 
5.4. Worst case scenarios and protection constraints 
This section aims at defining the worst-case conditions for each potential protection issue, that will be 
later used in order to define the maximum DRES penetration capacity, in terms of protection problems. 
 
5.4.1. Back-up protection blinding - Converter-interfaced DRES 
Initially, blinding of protection under the presence only of converter-interfaced DRES is examined. From 
the theoretical analysis conducted previously, the following remarks are useful for defining the worst-case 
scenario: 
- Fault current calculation are based on the Standard IEC60909 
- The distance between Bus 1 and the DRES in feeder 2 does not affect the fault current 
- The worst case for a fault that takes place in feeder 1 is the DRES to be installed at the beginning of the 
feeder, while the fault takes place at the end of the feeder. 
The above-mentioned remarks simplify a lot the definition of the worst-case conditions, regarding the 
blinding of the protection system. As has been shown in Case C, for a converter-interfaced DRES installed in 
feeder 2 and a fault taking place in feeder 1, the upstream grid fault current contribution is not affected by the 
location of the of the DRES, but only by grid SC capacity and DRES power. The higher the power the lower 
the upstream grid fault current contribution. The maximum penetration level (installed DRES capacity) of 
converter-interfaced DRES can be calculated parametrically, using Eq.(4.24) for Z12=dmax, and  Z23=0, in 
relation to the maximum length of a feeder (dmax), the upstream grid short-circuit capacity and the converter 
fault current capability (Figure 5.19). The outcome of Eq. (4.24) must be at least equal to the short-circuit 
current settings of protection relay R0 (ISC_Grid ≥ IR0SC). 
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Figure 5.19:  Worst case scenario with converter-interfaced DRES only. 
 
5.4.2. Back-up protection blinding - Directly-Coupled DRES 
In the case of directly-coupled SG, as it has been presented in Section 5.2.2 (Case A), the point of 
installation of the SG in feeder 2 affects the fault current contribution of the upstream grid. The worst-case 
scenario is the one where the SG is installed as closer to Bus 1, while the fault takes place at the most remote 
location of feeder 1. In terms of mathematical equations, the worst-case scenario can be described by Eq. 
(4.11) for Z14=0, Z23=0 and Z12=dmax. 
 
5.4.3. Blinding of feeder protection - Converter-interfaced DRES 
If a large capacity of DRES is installed downstream of feeder relay (R1/R2) and a fault takes place at the 
far end of the same feeder, the protection relay might not detect the fault due to the contribution of the DRES 
to the fault current (Figure 5.20). At the same time, blinding of the back-up relay is also possible due to 
reduction of the contribution by the upstream grid as explained earlier. As presented in Section 5.2.5, the 
worst-case scenario is the one where the converter-interfaced DRES is installed close to Bus 1, while the 
fault takes place at the end of feeder 1. This case can be described by Eq. (4.29) for Z12=0, Z23= dmax and 
IC2=0. 
 
Figure 5.20: Feeder protection blinding explained. 
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5.4.4. Blinding of feeder protection – Directly-Coupled DRES 
The analysis become somewhat more complicated when directly-coupled DRES are connected to the 
grid. Since the upstream grid fault current contribution does not increase monotonously as the distance from 
Bus 1 increases, (Section 5.2.3), an algorithm needs to be defined in order to determine the worst-case 
scenario. Figure 5.21 depicts the examined grid topology, where dmin is the distance between the DRES and 
Bus 1, and dmax the most remote bus of the this feeder. The algorithm presented in Figure 5.22 and aims to 
find to distance dmin, for which the upstream fault current is minimized. It is proved that dmin is independent 
of the DRES capacity. Determining dmin will allow the parametrical calculation of the minimum upstream 
grid contribution and consequently the maximum DRES penetration, using Eq.(4.16) for Z12=dmin and 
Z23=dmax - dmin. The outcome of Eq. (4.16) must be at least equal to the protection settings of relay R0 (ISC_Grid 
≥ IR0SC). 
 
Figure 5.21: Worst case scenario with directly-coupled SG DRES only. 
 
Regarding the problems of blinding of the back-up and feeder protection, it can be concluded that in 
general both problems are more likely to appear when the DRES are connected closer to Bus 1 and the fault 
takes place at the most remote node of feeder 1. The algorithm for the calculation of the intermediate 
location of feeder 1, where the installation of a directly-coupled SG minimizes the upstream grid fault 
current contribution, adds more precision to the conducted analysis. Both problems are heavily affected by 
the grid topology and mainly the length of the feeders.  
An analysis in terms of simulation in DiGSILEN Powerfactory is performed and the results are presented 
in Figure 5.23. As it is shown, “partial” blinding of the feeder relay is very likely to appear in all cases. The 
term “partial” has been introduced to describe the case where the fault current is less than the short-circuit 
threshold of the protection curve, but the relay will trip due to the overload time-overcurrent inverse curve. 
As expected, the presence of SG has greater impact (compared to the case of converter-interfaced DRES) in 
the fault current contribution of the upstream grid.  
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From the same figures, it can be noticed that in the presence of directly-coupled SG, the problem of “full” 
blinding of back-up protection appeared, when the upstream grid short-circuit capacity is relatively low 
(100MVA). 
 
 
Figure 5.22: Algorithm for worst case scenario with directly-coupled DRES only. 
 
The algorithm implements the following steps: 
Step 1: Set the maximum length of a feeder within the grid; 
Step 2: Set initial values to the minimum distance (d1=0) and the grid fault current (e.g. ISC=100kA); 
Step 3: Calculate the upstream grid fault contribution from eq. (5.16); 
Step 4: If the fault current magnitude is lower than the previous value, save new value. Else, dmin=d1; 
Step 5: Repeat the procedure for the entire feeder length with step changes of dstep. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.23: Feeder and back-up protection blinding: a) converter-interfaced DRES, 500MVA b) converter-interfaced DRES, 
100MVA, c) SG, 500MVA and d) SG, 100MVA. 
 
5.4.5. Increase of short-circuit capacity - Converter-interfaced DRES only 
The next issue that could be a limiting factor for the increase of DRES penetration, in terms of proper 
protection operation, is the increase of the short-circuit current in a feeder. In the presences of high power 
DRES the total short-circuit level might exceed the short-circuit breaking capability of the interrupting 
device (e.g. circuit breaker) at the beginning of the feeder. The problem appears due to the fault contribution 
of the DRES located at a nearby feeder. This protection is described in Figure 5.24.  
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Figure 5.24: Increase of short-circuit level at feeder 1. 
 
In the case of full-converter interfaced DRES the increase of the total initial short-circuit is affected only 
by the power of the DRES and not by the distance from Bus 1. Circuit breakers are rated for short-circuit 
currents directly on their terminals. Thus, the impact of installing a DRES in a nearby feeder while the fault 
occurs directly on the breaker terminal has to be examined. The total initial short-circuit current can be 
calculated by Eq. (4.23) for Z12=0 and must not exceed the breaking capacity of the circuit breaker (CB1). 
Figure 5.25 presents the variation of the short circuit current that takes place at the terminals of the CB under 
different grid configurations (grid short-circuit capacity, SG location and power). This impact is very limited 
due to the limited short-circuit capability of power converters. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.25: Initial short-circuit current for a fault at CB1 terminals: a) vs short-circuit capacity and DRES power and b) vs 
distance from Bus 1 and DRES power. 
5.4.6. Increase of short-circuit capacity - Directly-Coupled DRES only 
When referring to directly-coupled SG, their impact on the short-circuit current in feeder 1 is affected by 
their point of installation in feeder 2. Specifically, the closer the DRES at Bus 1 the larger the initial short-
circuit current at the CB terminals. Moreover, as already explained, the rated short-circuit breaking capacity 
of CB is calculated for a solid short circuit at its terminals. Figure 5.26 presents the variation of the short 
circuit current that takes place at the terminals of the CB under different grid configurations (grid short-
circuit capacity, SG location and power). 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.26: Initial short-circuit current for a fault at CB1 terminals: a) vs short-circuit capacity and DRES power and b) vs 
distance from Bus 1 and DRES power. 
 
Compared to the case of converter-interfaced DRES, the impact on the total short-circuit capacity is much 
higher. As can be noticed, the worst case is having as SG installed at Bus 1 (Z12=0). In this case the 
maximum short circuit current given by Eq. (5.10) (for Z12=0), must be less that the breaking capacity of 
circuit breaker CB1. So, even in this case the limiting factor is again the power of the installed DRES. 
 
5.4.7. Sympathetic tripping 
Integration of large scale DRES in distribution systems results in the bidirectional flow of the fault 
current on most of the feeders/lines. The false tripping of protective devices (or sympathetic tripping) could 
occur in the distribution network when a DRES is close to a fault and it starts participating in fault current 
that reaches the pick limit of the healthy feeder and causes tripping of a healthy part of the network. The 
basic principle of false tripping is shown in Figure 5.27. 
 
Figure 5.27: Sympathetic tripping explained. 
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Sympathetic tripping is mainly affected by the DRES short-circuit contribution, which in turn depends on 
the fault location and the upstream grid short-circuit capacity. In order to formulate the sympathetic tripping 
problem both for directly-coupled SG and converter-interfaced DRES the method for short-circuit 
calculation included in Standard IEC60909 will be used. For the case of an SG located in feeder 2, while the 
fault takes place in feeder 1, the SG fault current is given by Eq. (5.12). Respectively, for the case of a 
converter-interfaced DRES, its short-circuit current is equal to the rated current (unless any other current 
value has been specified), since it is considered as a current source. Figure 5.28 presents the fault current 
contribution by the DRES which is the cause of sympathetic tripping. It can be noticed that the upstream grid 
short-circuit capacity has a limited impact in the case of directly-coupled SG and no impact in the case of 
converter-interfaced DRES. Therefore, in both cases the main factor is the distance between the position of 
the DRES and Bus 1. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.28: DRES short-circuit contribution: a) vs short-circuit capacity and DRES power (directly-coupled SG), b) vs distance 
from Bus 1 and DRES power (directly-coupled SG, c) vs short-circuit capacity and DRES power (converter-interfaced DRES) and d) 
vs distance from Bus 1 and DRES power (converter-interfaced DRES). 
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5.4.8. Summary of protection problems in the two-feeder benchmark grid 
From all previous cases, it is clear that the impact on protection by DRES increases when the DRES are 
installed near Bus 1. In this section, it will be examined which of the aforementioned problem poses lower 
limit to the penetration level of DRES. Towards this, Table 3 summarizes the constrains for each case of 
potential protection malfunction and the type of DRES. 
In Figure 5.29 and Figure 5.30 the four main protection issues are summarized and an estimation of the 
maximum DRES hosting capacity is performed. In all figures the respective protection settings as calculated 
in Section 5.2.1 are denoted with a dashed curve. As it is shown, in the case of SG, the problems of (full) 
feeder and (partial) back-up protection blinding, as well as sympathetic tripping might appear. On the 
contrary, in the case of converter-interfaced DRES the only protection issue that might appear is the (partial) 
blinding of back-up protection.  
Table 3: Summary of constraints to avoid protection issues 
Protection Issue Converter-interfaced DRES Directly-coupled DRES 
A: Back-up protection 
blinding 
 
𝐼&'_F* ≥ 𝐼E_\¦5 𝐸𝑞. (5.24)		𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑍MS = 𝑑)Cg 𝐼&'_F* ≥ 𝐼E_\¦5 𝐸𝑞. (5.11)		 𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑍MN = 0	&	𝑍MS = 𝑑)Cg	&	𝑍S~ = 	0 
B: Feeder protection 
blinding 
𝐼&'_F* ≥ 𝐼EM_\¦5 𝐸𝑞. (5.29)		𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑍S~ = 𝑑)Cg 𝑍MS = 0	 
𝐼&'_F* ≥ 𝐼EM_\¦5 𝐸𝑞. (5.16)		 𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑍MS = 𝑑)*+	&	𝑍S~ = 𝑑)Cg −		𝑑)*+		 
C: Increase of SC 
capacity 
𝐼'M ≥ 𝐼yzz 𝐸𝑞. (5.23)		𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑍MS = 0 𝐼'M ≥ 𝐼y
zz 𝐸𝑞. (5.10)		 𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑍MS = 0		𝑎𝑛𝑑		𝑍MN = 0		 
D: Sympathetic 
tripping 
𝐼'M ≤ 𝐼ES_\¦5 
 
𝐼& ≤ 𝐼ES_\¦5 𝐸𝑞. (5.12)		 𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑍MS = 0		𝑎𝑛𝑑		𝑍MN = 0		 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 Figure 5.29: Protection issues with directly-coupled SG in the two-feeder grid a) Back-up protection blinding, b) Increase 
of short-circuit capacity, c) feeder protection blinding and d) Sympathetic tripping. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
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(c) 
 
(d) 
 Figure 5.30: Protection issues with converter-interfaced DRES in the two-feeder grid a) Back-up protection blinding, b) 
Increase of short-circuit capacity, c) feeder protection blinding and d) Sympathetic tripping. 
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5.5. Application: MV network case study 
5.5.1. Converter-interfaced DRES in CIGRE MV network 
The outcomes of the previous are validate in a representative MV network. This network will be the 
CIGRE MV test grid is shown in Figure 5.31. It consists of 13 buses. Two tests are performed for feeder 1. 
Initially, three-phase short circuits are performed in all buses, while the DRES (only converter-interfaced) is 
placed in different buses within the grid. All possible combinations of fault position and point of DRES 
installation within feeder 1 are examined. The short-circuit current contribution from the upstream grid is 
calculated according to the Standard IEC60909. The grid parameters are given in Appendix A. The DRES 
capacity is considered constant and equal to 10MVA. 
 
Figure 5.31: CIGRE MV distribution network. 
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Table 4: Distance between Bus 1 and fault location [m] 
FAULT LOCATION (BUS No) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 0 2800 7200 7800 8400 9900 10200 8500 8800 9600 9900 
 
Table 5: Upstream grid fault contribution [kA] 
 FAULT LOCATION (BUS No) 
D
R
ES
 C
O
N
N
EC
TI
O
N
 (B
U
S 
N
o)
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 4,62 2,377 1,201 1,133 1,04 0,872 0,848 1,024 0,987 0,904 0,871 
2 4,62 2,539 1,294 1,201 1,123 0,945 0,919 1,106 1,067 0,979 0,944 
3 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,347 1,262 1,068 1,039 1,244 1,2 1,104 1,067 
4 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,367 1,282 1,085 1,039 1,244 1,2 1,104 1,067 
5 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,367 1,3 1,1 1,039 1,244 1,2 1,104 1,067 
6 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,367 1,3 1,144 1,039 1,244 1,2 1,104 1,067 
7 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,347 1,262 1,068 1,121 1,285 1,24 1,142 1,103 
8 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,347 1,262 1,068 1,075 1,285 1,24 1,142 1,103 
9 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,347 1,262 1,068 1,075 1,285 1,25 1,151 1,112 
10 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,347 1,262 1,068 1,075 1,285 1,25 1,173 1,134 
11 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,347 1,262 1,068 1,075 1,285 1,25 1,173 1,143 
 
Table 6: Initial short-circuit current, IEC60909 [kA] 
 FAULT LOCATION (BUS No) 
D
R
ES
 C
O
N
N
EC
TI
O
N
 (B
U
S 
N
o)
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 4,981 2,738 1,562 1,474 1,401 1,233 1,209 1,385 1,348 1,265 1,232 
2 4,981 2,9 1,655 1,562 1,484 1,306 1,28 1,467 1,428 1,34 1,305 
3 4,981 2,9 1,81 1,708 1,623 1,429 1,4 1,605 1,561 1,47 1,432 
4 4,981 2,9 1,81 1,728 1,643 1,446 1,4 1,605 1,561 1,465 1,428 
5 4,981 2,9 1,81 1,728 1,661 1,461 1,4 1,605 1,561 1,465 1,428 
6 4,981 2,9 1,81 1,728 1,661 1,505 1,4 1,605 1,561 1,465 1,428 
7 4,981 2,9 1,81 1,708 1,623 1,429 1,482 1,646 1,601 1,503 1,464 
8 4,981 2,9 1,81 1,708 1,623 1,429 1,436 1,646 1,601 1,503 1,464 
9 4,981 2,9 1,81 1,708 1,623 1,429 1,436 1,646 1,611 1,512 1,473 
10 4,981 2,9 1,81 1,708 1,623 1,429 1,436 1,646 1,611 1,534 1,495 
11 4,981 2,9 1,81 1,708 1,623 1,429 1,436 1,646 1,611 1,534 1,504 
 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 validate the theoretical analysis preceded previously. Conditional coloring is used to 
highlight the results. Red means that the DRES have a larger effect on the upstream grid fault current 
contribution. As it was expected, the worst-case scenario is the one where the fault takes place at the most 
remote bus (Bus 7) of the network and the DRES is located at the nearest position (Bus 1). 
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5.5.2. Directly-Coupled DRES in CIGRE MV network 
In this section, the impact of installing directly-coupled SG within the CIGRE MV network is tested. As 
it has been presented in Section 5.2.3, the installation of directly-coupled SG has a different impact on the 
fault current contribution by the upstream network, compared to the directly-coupled SG. The same 
methodology like in Section 5.5.1 is used. A three-phase short circuit is performed in all buses, with the SG 
connected every time in different bus. All possible combinations of fault position and point of DRES 
installation are examined. The results are shown in Tables 7 and 8. 
Table 7: Upstream grid fault contribution (SG Only) 
 FAULT LOCATION (BUS No) 
D
R
ES
 C
O
N
N
EC
TI
O
N
 (B
U
S 
N
o)
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 4,54 1,73 0,875 0,819 0,773 0,67 0,655 0,763 0,74 0,689 0,67 
2 4,62 2,539 0,896 0,821 0,762 0,637 0,62 0,75 0,721 0,659 0,636 
3 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,21 1,047 0,759 0,725 1,015 0,943 0,806 0,758 
4 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,367 1,16 0,81 0,753 1,036 0,967 0,832 0,785 
5 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,367 1,3 0,87 0,776 1,054 0,987 0,855 0,808 
6 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,367 1,3 1,144 0,83 1,094 1,031 0,906 0,861 
7 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,262 1,127 0,87 1,121 1,285 1,186 0,999 0,935 
8 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,236 1,087 0,815 0,837 1,285 1,168 0,955 0,885 
9 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,242 1,096 0,827 0,849 1,285 1,25 1,007 0,929 
10 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,254 1,115 0,853 0,875 1,285 1,25 1,173 1,066 
11 4,62 2,539 1,449 1,258 1,122 0,863 0,885 1,285 1,25 1,173 1,143 
 
Table 8: Initial short-circuit current, IEC60909 (SG Only) 
 FAULT LOCATION (BUS No) 
D
R
ES
 C
O
N
N
EC
TI
O
N
 (B
U
S 
N
o)
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 8,283 3,254 1,645 1,539 1,454 1,26 1,233 1,435 1,391 1,296 1,259 
2 6,818 6,24 2,202 2,018 1,874 1,565 1,523 1,843 1,772 1,621 1,563 
3 5,894 4,354 5,122 2,275 3,7 2,684 2,564 3,586 3,334 2,848 2,679 
4 5,822 4,228 4,695 5,039 4,276 2,986 2,44 3,357 3,133 2,697 2,545 
5 5,762 4,126 4,372 4,644 4,971 3,329 2,342 3,179 2,977 2,579 2,439 
6 5,624 3,899 3,724 3,864 4,037 4,816 2,133 2,812 2,651 2,329 2,213 
7 5,604 3,866 3,641 3,17 2,831 2,185 4,793 3,962 3,657 3,08 2,884 
8 5,749 4,104 4,305 3,672 3,23 2,42 3,231 4,956 4,507 3,684 3,412 
9 5,718 4,053 4,151 3,557 3,14 2,368 3,12 4,721 4,921 3,967 3,656 
10 5,65 3,941 3,836 3,319 2,951 2,257 2,892 4,248 4,395 4,845 4,403 
11 5,624 3,898 3,721 3,231 2,881 2,215 2,809 4,079 4,208 4,602 4,815 
 
As it was expected in contrary the converter-interfaced DRES, the worst case is not the one where the SG is 
connected at Bus 1, but at Bus 2 while the fault takes place at the most remote point of the feeder (Bus 7). 
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5.6. Protecting the CIGRE MV network 
For protection, we assume one circuit breaker in each feeder (R1 and R2) and one back-up circuit breaker 
R0 in the MV side of the HV/MV transformer 
a. Feeder 1 protection relay R1. 
The feeder 1 (underground network) ampacity Ifr=285A. We calculate the SC current for a 3-phase SC at the 
outermost bus (Bus 7, length 10.2 km) Iscmin = 1089A.   Relay R1 setting is  
I2f1 = max {1.5 Ifr, min (0.9*Iscmin, 3.0*Ifr)} = max {428, min (980, 855)} = 855.A Time delay TR1 = 50.00ms   
b. Feeder 2 protection relay R2. 
The feeder 2 (overhead line) ampacity Ifr=276A. We calculate the SC current for a 3-phase SC at the end of 
the feeder (Bus 14, length 20.1km) Iscmin = 828 A.   Relay R2 setting is  
I2f = max {1.5 Ifr, min (0.9*Iscmin, 3.0*Ifr)} = max {414, min (745, 828)} = 745A. Time delay TR2 = 60.00ms 
c. Transformer secondary protection relay R0 (Back-up relay) 
Transformer rating is Itr=722A. Feeder 2 is the feeder with minimum SC current, so Iscmin_all = 828A.  Relay 
R0 setting is  
I2t = max {1.5*Itr, min (0.9*Iscmin_all, 3.0*Itr)} = max {1083, min ( 745, 2166)}= 1083A.  
Time delay TR0 = 300.00ms 
The protection curves for the MV CIGRE networks are given in Figure 5.32. 
 
Figure 5.32: MV CIGRE Network: feeder protection curves. 
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5.6.1. Feeder 1: Protection problems 
Initially, the problem of feeder protection blinding is investigated. In the examined case, the DRES is 
connected at Bus 2 of the CIGRE MV network, while the fault takes place at the most remote bus, i.e. Bus 7. 
The results are shown in Figure 5.33. Figure 5.33(a) refers to the case of a directly-coupled SG, while Figure 
5.33(b) to the respective case of a converter-interfaced DRES. As shown, in the case of an SG, increase of 
penetration level more than 45% of the feeder capacity might lead to “partial” blinding of feeder protection, 
while in the case of a converter-interface DRES this risk does not exist. Figure 5.33 presents the time-
overcurrent plots for worst case scenario (DRES at Bus 2, at Bus 7), under maximum DRES penetration 
(10MVA). Figure 5.33(c) refers to the case of directly-coupled DRES, while Figure 5.33(d) to the case of a 
converter-interfaced DRES. These plot validate the theoretical calculations of Figure 5.33(a) and (b).  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.33: MV CIGRE Network: feeder protection blinding: a) Feeder Relay R1 Current vs DRES Power (directly-coupled SG), b) 
Feeder Relay R1 Current vs DRES Power (Converter-interfaced), c) Time-overcurrent plot directly-coupled (SG) DRES 10MVA and 
d) Time-overcurrent plot Converter-interfaced DRES 10MVA. 
 
Although feeder protection blinding might appear only in case of directly-coupled SG, “partial” blinding 
of transformer/back-up protection will appear in any of the two examined cases. However, “full” blinding of 
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the back-up protection will never appear for this grid configuration.  The results for back-up protection are 
presented in Figure 5.34. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.34: MV CIGRE Network: Back-up protection blinding: a) Back-up Relay R0 Current vs DRES Power (directly-coupled 
SG), b) Back-up Relay R0 Current vs DRES Power (Converter-interfaced), c) Time-overcurrent plot directly-coupled (SG) DRES 
10MVA and d) Time-overcurrent plot Converter-interfaced DRES 10MVA. 
 
The last protection issue that will be examined in this section is the sympathetic tripping. Sympathetic 
tripping might occur when a DRES contributes to a fault that takes place at a nearby feeder, and the short-
circuit contribution from the healthy feeder exceeds the relay pick-up current. In Section 5.4, it has been 
shown that the worst-case scenario is the one where the fault takes place at Bus 1 and the DRES is also 
installed close to the same bus. Results from the case of a directly-coupled SG and a converter-interfaced 
DRES are presented in Figure 5.35. It is obvious that sympathetic tripping is likely to appear in the case of 
an SG, while in the case of converter-interfaced DRES it is unlikely due to the limited current capability of 
power converters. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.35: MV CIGRE Network: Sympathetic Tripping of feeder 1: a) feeder Relay R1 Current vs DRES Power (directly-coupled 
SG), b) Feeder Relay R1 Current vs DRES Power (Converter-interfaced),  c) Time-overcurrent plot directly-coupled (SG) DRES 
10MVA and d) Time-overcurrent plot Converter-interfaced DRES 10MVA. 
 
5.6.2. Feeder 2: Protection problems 
Regarding feeder 2 of the modified CIGRE MV network with total feeder length equal to 20km, the 
results show the most of the protection issues are possible to appear. In the examined case, the DRES is 
connected at Bus 12 of the CIGRE MV network, while the fault takes place at the most remote bus, i.e. Bus 
13.  Figure 5.36 presents the feeder protection blinding problem. Figure 5.36(a) refers to the case of a 
directly-coupled SG, while Figure 5.36(b) to the respective case of a converter-interfaced DRES. As shown, 
in both cases “partial” blinding of feeder protection is likely to appear even at low DRES penetration (25-
40%). Figure 5.36(c) and (d) present the respective Time-Overcurrent diagrams for a 10MVA SG and a 
converter-interfaced DRES respectively.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.36: MV CIGRE Network: feeder protection blinding: a) Feeder Relay R2 Current vs DRES Power (directly-coupled SG), b) 
Feeder Relay R2 Current vs DRES Power (Converter-interfaced),  c) Time-overcurrent plot directly-coupled (SG) DRES 10MVA and 
d) Time-overcurrent plot Converter-interfaced DRES 10MVA. 
 
As far as the back-up protection is concerned, even at DRES penetration 30-45% it might be completely 
blinded as shown in Figure 5.37. In the case of directly-coupled SG the hosting capacity limit is set to 35%, 
while in the case of converter-interfaced DRES it is limited up to 45%. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.37: MV CIGRE Network: Back-up protection blinding: a) Back-up Relay R0 Current vs DRES Power (directly-coupled 
SG), b) Back-up Relay R0 Current vs DRES Power (Converter-interfaced), c) Time-overcurrent plot directly-coupled (SG) DRES 
10MVA and d) Time-overcurrent plot Converter-interfaced DRES 10MVA. 
 
The last protection issue to be examined is the sympathetic tripping. Sympathetic tripping might occur 
when a DRES contributes to a fault that takes place at a nearby feeder. As presented in Section 5.4, the 
worst-case scenario is the one where the fault takes place at Bus 1 and the DRES is also installed close to the 
same bus. Results from the case of a directly-coupled SG and a converter-interfaced DRES are presented in 
Figure 5.38. It is obvious that sympathetic tripping is likely to appear in the case of an SG, while in the case 
pf converter-interfaced DRES it is unlikely due to the limited current capability of power converters. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.38: MV CIGRE Network: Sympathetic Tripping of feeder 2: a) feeder Relay R2 Current vs DRES Power (directly-coupled 
SG), b) Feeder Relay R2 Current vs DRES Power (Converter-interfaced), c) Time-overcurrent plot directly-coupled (SG) DRES 
10MVA and d) Time-overcurrent plot Converter-interfaced DRES 10MVA. 
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6. Maximum DRES Hosting Capacity Estimation 
This section aims at estimating the maximum permissible DRES capacity in terms of smooth operation of 
the protection system. As presented in Section 5.4, each case of potential protection malfunction poses 
specific limits regarding either the fault current contribution by the upstream grid (in order to prevent back-
up protection blinding), or the short-circuit current of a feeder (in order to prevent feeder protection blinding 
of sympathetic tripping). In Table 3, the constraints/worst-case conditions for each case have been 
summarized in form of mathematical equations and will be used in this section to define the maximum 
DRES hosting capacity. Hosting capacity will be defined for each type of DRES as follows: 
a) For directly-coupled DRES/SG, hosting capacity will be defined as the maximum synchronous 
generator apparent power SSG.  
b) For converter-interfaced DRES, hosting capacity is defined as the maximum DRES power, with the 
assumption that the fault current contribution by the DRES is equal to its rated current. 
In order to define the DRES hosting capacity an algorithm is developed, which takes into account the grid 
topology and the settings of the protection relays. The steps are described below: 
• Step 1: Set the length of the longest feeder, dmax 
• Step 2: Set the upstream grid short-circuit capacity 
• Step 3: Set the feeder protection relay R1 pick-up currents IR1>, IR1>> (ANSI 50/51) 
• Step 4: Set the back-up protection relay R0 pick-up currents IR0>, IR0>> (ANSI 50/51) 
• Step 5: [Back-up protection blinding] Use Table 3: Case A to design ISC_Grid vs PDRES.  
Hosting capacity limit H1= Intersection ISC_Grid with IR0.  
• Step 6: [Feeder protection blinding] Use Table 3: Case B to design ISC_Grid vs PDRES 
Hosting capacity limit H2= Intersection ISC_Grid with IR1.  
• Step 7: [Increase of SC capacity] Use Table 3: Case C to design 𝐼yzzvs PDRES 
Hosting capacity limit H3= Intersection with ICB1.  
• Step 8: [Sympathetic Tripping] Use Table 3: Case C to find DRES current contribution 
Hosting capacity limit H4= IC1 (for converter-interfaced), H4= ISG (for directly-coupled).  
• Step 9: Find the minimum of H1, H2, H3 and H4. 
These steps are summarized in the flowchart shown in Figure 6.1: 
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Figure 6.1: Maximum DRES hosting capacity estimation.  
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7. Conclusions & Discussion 
The object of this thesis is to investigate the impact of protection schemes on MV network supplied with 
DRES. Initially, the currently-used protection practices have been presented, which led to the development 
of the protection rules of the tested benchmark networks, that have been used in this this thesis, in order to 
evaluate the protection problems. The protection problems that have been considered in this thesis are; a) the 
blinding of back-up and feeder protection, b) sympathetic tripping and c) increase of short-circuit capacity. 
After the review part, the analytical expressions for the calculation of the fault currents in a two-feeder 
benchmark grid have been derived. This simple grid topology has been selected because all other networks 
can be degenerated to this one, while it can be used for representing both LV and MV networks. Two 
different types of distributed generation units have been examined; the directly-coupled and the converter-
interfaced DRESs. Each of them presents a completely different response during grid faults. The method for 
the calculation of the initial short circuit current was based on the Standard IEC 60909. According to the 
2016 revision of this Standard, converter-interfaced DRES units are considered as current sources, while 
directly-coupled DRES are considered as voltage sources. A parametric analysis has been performed in 
respect to the position, the power of the DRES and the upstream short circuit capacity.  
The results from the two-feeder benchmark grid have been extended to a modified version of the CIGRE 
MV network. The modification refers to the line lengths, in order to examine the effect of longer lengths on 
the protection issues. The worst-case conditions for each protection problem have been defined. Then, these 
conditions have been used in order to evaluate the maximum hosting capacity of the grids, as limited by the 
smooth operation of protection devices. The main results from the CIGRE MV network can be summarized 
as follows: 
• DRESs connected to the MV distribution grid might affect the performance of the conventional 
overcurrent protection schemes considerably. 
• Blinding of back-up protection is heavily affected by the type and location of the DRES. In the case 
of directly-coupled SG, results showed that protection might be fully blinded if the penetration level 
is more that 35%, while in the case of converter-interfaced DRES maximum hosting capacity is 
limited to 45%.  
• Regarding feeder protection blinding, only “partial” blinding is likely to appear, with the problem 
again being worst in the case of directly-coupled SG.  
• Sympathetic tripping poses an even lower limit to DRES penetration level (30%).  
• Finally, regarding the increase of short-circuit level\, such a problem seems very unlikely to appear, 
considering typical CB short-circuit breaking capability equal to 12.5kA.  
Results can be extended to the LV distribution grid. The main difference between the MV and LV cases is 
the employed protection device. In LV networks fuses are employed as protection means, while in MV 
networks circuit breakers are used, controlled by protection relays. Moreover, in LV distribution grids, lines 
are significantly shorter. According to the preceding analysis of Section 5.2, the shorter the lines, the less 
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likely it is to appear protection problems. Moreover, fuses have an inherent inverse time protection curve, 
with tripping time ranging from milliseconds up to several minutes. Thus, it is clear that we do not expect 
any significant protection issues, especially in the case of converter-interfaced DRES. 
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Appendix A 
A.1. Medium Voltage CIGRE Network Benchmark 
A.1.1. Network Data 
As mentioned before, overhead lines and underground cables are used for the connection between the 
nodes. In the first case, the lines are mounted on towers without neutral wires. The specific connections and 
line lengths for the network benchmark are listed in Table 9, along with their positive and zero sequence 
resistance, reactance and susceptance values. The Conductor ID stands for the aforementioned different types 
of conductors. 
Table 9: Connections and line parameters of the CIGRE MV network benchmark [46]. 
 
 
The transformer parameters are also given in Table.10, in which the calculated impedances are referred to 
the secondary side. It has to be noted that tap changers should be used in order to achieve the power flows 
within an acceptable voltage range. The applied tap settings are distinguished between the primary tap 
setting, which allows for ±5% change of winding voltage in 2.5% increment without load and the secondary, 
which allows for ±10% change in 0.625 increment load changing taps. 
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Table.10: Transformer parameters of the CIGRE MV network benchmark. 
 
 
Finally, the parameters for the equivalent HV system connected to the substation transformers are given in 
Table 11 
Table 11: HV equivalent system parameters of the CIGRE MV network benchmark 
 
 
A.1.2. Load Data 
The coincident peak loads for each node of the benchmark are shown in Table 12 and they are assumed to 
be symmetric and therefore equal in every phase. The appropriate coincident factor has been applied to the 
load values in order to take into account he number of the consumers served. Also, it can be observed that 
the load values at nodes 1 and 12 are much larger than the rest. This is because they represent additional 
feeders served by the same transformer and they are not modeled in detail in this benchmark. 
 
Table 12: Load parameters of the CIGRE MV network benchmark. 
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